The Loeb-Leopold case - The Clarence Darrow Collection

The Loeb-Leopold Case
to have acted treacherously in intent, our friendship must
cease. You circumvent that by saying you never could
have held this opinion because you believe me to have
acted hastily, etc. I did my best in stating that I was
wholly responsible for all I said and did, since I had
planned it all, and if there were malice at all it would
be malice aforethought. You refuse to believe me.
Now, that is not my fault. I have done my best to tell
you the true facts, (since they were in my disadvantage)
and hence have discharged my obligation. I still insist
that I have planned all I did. You can believe this or
not as you like or come to your own decision, on whether
you still think I acted treacherously. If you say you
do not, then I shall infer either that you never thought
so (although you accuse me of it) or that you have
changed your mind (and imply these as an apology for
ever thinking so) and continue to be your friend. All
I want from you then is a statement that you do not
now think me to have acted treacherously in intent,
which I will construe as above. Then it is up to you
whether you will forego my statement of wrong action or
will on your part break up our friendship. Please wire
me at my expense to the Biltmore Hotel, New York,
immediately on receipt, stating, one, whether you wish to
break our friendship or to forego my statement, or, two,
whether or not you still think me to have acted treacher-
ously. If you want further discussion on either point
merely wire me that you must see me to discuss it before
you decide. Now, that is all that is in point to our controversy
but I am going to add a little more in an
effort to explain my system of a Nietzschian philosophy
with regard to you. It may not have occurred to you
why a mere mistake in judgment on your part should be
treated as a crime, when on the part of another it should
not be so considered. Here are the reasons. In formu-
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