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58Alexander Sergunin(TEN-E). 4 Despite the fact that the Nord Stream is formally run onthe European side by private companies from Germany, theNetherlands and France, some BSR countries have objected to thisproject. This pipeline is of pan-European significance, because Russiannatural gas is delivered not only to the above-mentioned countries,but also to many other west and central European countries. Thereare also plans to build new lines to the BSR countries and even to theUK. The Nord Steam capacity is 55 billion meters 3 . 5An obstacle to the further progress of the EU-Russian energy dialogueconsists of Moscow’s unwillingness to ratify the European Energy Charter(EEC), signed by Russia under President Yeltsin, but later viewed as discriminatoryin character. The separation between production, reprocessingand transportation of gas, as called for by the EEC, is not acceptablefor Russia. A ratification of the Charter would, in practice, also necessitatethe reor ganization of the Russian energy monopolists, such as Gazprom,Rosneft and Transneft, and would also provide foreign companies with farbetter access to the energy sector of Russia’s economy. These remain, as seenfrom a Russian perspective, problematic and challenging issues. 6Another obstacle to further EU-Russia energy cooperation in the BSRis Russia’s plan to build a nuclear plant in the Kaliningrad Region (KR) by2016. 7 This intention runs against the dominant anti-nuclear attitudes thatare especially strong in countries like Germany and Italy, which are amongthe key Russian partners in Europe.••Improvement of the BSR transportation system. Moscow and Brusselsplan to further develop pan-European transport corridors to increasethe BSR’s potential as the EU’s gateway to Asia. According to the4Documentation of Nord Stream project. www.nord-stream.com/download/document/72/?language=ru (Home page of Nord Stream; visited 10.05.2013.).5Nord Stream Project. http://www.nord-stream.com/ru/o-proekte/ (Home page of NordStream; visited 10.05.2013.).6Sergunin A., Makarychev A. The Polish EU Presidency and Russia: a Surprise Success Storyor Time Coincidence? Policy Paper. Budapest: Central European University, 2012, p. 8. https://cens.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/publications/policybriefno7eufrontiersalexander-sergunin.pdf (Homepage of CENS; visited 12.05. 2013.).7Joenniemi P., Sergunin A. Kaliningrad: Less of an Outpost, More of a Bridge. In: PoliticalState of the Region Report 2012. Eds. Bernd Henningsen and Tobias Etzold. Copenhagen: The BalticDevelopment Forum, 2012, p. 29.