Nr.2(10) / 2013.gada jūnijs - Par es.gov.lv

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Russia and the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: bridging a (mis)connection gap 67term, Moscow had neither developed a new conceptual approach to its BSRpolicy, nor planned to interact with Brussels’ strategies in the region. 29The program 30 had two major sections. In the first chapter, the Russianpresidency’s “main priorities” were outlined: (1) cooperation in the field ofmodernisation and innovation with a focus on clusters of growth; (2) establishmentof a network of public-private partnerships (PPP) as a platformfor sustainable growth; (3) promotion of tolerance as a means of combatingtendencies of radicalism and extremism; (4) promotion of people-to-peoplecontacts, facilitating the visa regime.In the second section, the document explained how the above prioritiesare linked to the CBSS long-term priorities established by the Council’s RigaDeclaration, June 2008. Particularly, the program listed a number of ongoingand future projects in areas such as economic development, environmentalprotection and sustainable development, education and culture, energy, civilsecurity and human dimension.The program, and Russia’s policies in the BSR, come across as a ratherparadoxical mixture of general declarations (main priorities) and an instrumentalist/technocraticapproach (long-term priorities) that were often notinterlinked with each other.For example, Russia pays great attention to the modernization programsin the BSR. However, it should be noted that Moscow and Brusselshave two different philosophies of modernization. While Russia’s approach israther instrumentalist and pragmatic (more investment and innovations areneeded to develop the regional economy, i.e. interest-driven approach), theEU is also concerned about the rule of law, good governance, anti-corruptionand anti-crime measures, human rights, etc. (value-based approach).Despite its ambition to be maximally specific, Russia’s strategy inthe BSR has a number of rather strange lacunae. For example, the aforementionedprogram almost lacked a description of concrete projects underthe SEBA aegis. The SEBA itself was mentioned only once in passim and this29Oldberg I. Soft security in Baltic Sea Region. Russian interests in the Council of the BalticSea States. Occasional UP Papers. Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs. No. 12,2012, p. 17.30The Russian Presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (July 2012–June 2013). Ministryof Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. http://www.cbss-russia.ru/sbgm_eng.pdf (Homepage of CBSS; visited 10.05.2013.).
68Alexander Sergunincould not but confuse Germany, who launched this program during itsCBSS presidency (2011–2012) and hoped that Moscow would work hard tocomplete it. The document’s sections on economy and energy were too vagueand lacked specific details.As compared both to the initial German plans for SEBA and Russianpresidency priorities, the implementation process has brought about rathermodest results. Among the most significant projects the following ones canbe mentioned:•• The only PPP-related initiative was the signing of a credit agreementby the Russian “Vnesheconombank” and German State Bank KfWon extending $110 million for funding small and medium-sizeenterprises in north-western Russia. 31 The SMEs’ support is seenby both Russia and its BSR partners as an important priority forthe successful implementation of modernization programs andstrengthening the Russian middle class, which is seen as a main socialbase for democratic reforms in Russia. According to the project, theSMEs that aim at introducing high-tech innovations and “green”technologies will be given priority in terms of funding.•• The creation of a tourist cluster around Lake Vyshtynets, whichis located on the border of the Kaliningrad Region, Poland andLithuania. 32 The project aims at the development of a transnationalnature park, which will introduce new models of sustainable tourism,environmental education and active participation of the localpopulation. The idea is to make this cluster a role model for the entireBSR.•• Youth cooperation and higher education is another important priorityfor the Russian presidency. It put a lot of effort into successfullycontinuing the “Baltic Artek” summer camp project. The mainpurpose of this project is to make this summer camp a focal point forsustainable youth cooperation in the BSR.31Vnesheconombank and KfW Entered into a Credit Agreement under the Program of theCouncil of the Baltic Sea States. 16 November 2012, Moscow. http://www.cbss-russia.ru/en/1-2.html (Home page of CBSS; visited 10.05.2013.).32Modernisation Partnership for the South-Eastern Baltic Areа. http://www.cbss-russia.ru/en/projects-eng/seba-eng.html (Home page of CBSS; visited 10.05.2013.).
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