Nr.2(10) / 2013.gada jūnijs - Par es.gov.lv

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Russia and the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: bridging a (mis)connection gap 59EUSBSR priority No. 11, special focus should be given to removingnon infrastructure-related bottlenecks, including those associatedwith border-crossing. The Strategy also foresees Kaliningrad’s in -volvement in the modernization of the regional transport infrastructure.For example, there are plans to include Kaliningrad inthe Baltic Functional Airspace Block This initiative was launchedby Poland and Lithuania in 2004 and may radically improve thequality of management of flight in the region. 8 The EUSBSR also hasa priority with the title, “Cooperate for smarter transport”, whichaims at improving safety, freight logistics efficiency, shifting freightfrom road to rail and sea, and minimizing the environmental impactof transport in the region (e.g. the Green Corridor project from theports of Sweden, Denmark and Germany to the ports of Lithuaniaand Kaliningrad). 9••Maritime safety. The increasing trend towards transport of oil andliquefied natural gas by tankers via the BSR brings risks for theenvironment, especially in difficult winter conditions (iced sea).Under the EUSBSR priority No. 13, the EU and Russia plan to developa system of joint measures on maritime safety.••Environment protection. Russia takes part in the Baltic Sea ActionPlan, which is an ambitious program aimed at restoring the ecologicalstatus of the Baltic marine environment by 2021. 10 In addition, manyactions and projects concerning water, wastewater, solid waste andenergy efficiency with Russia are implemented in the frameworkof the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP).Together with Belarus, Russia also partakes in the comprehensiveregional pollution risk assessment in the context of the EUSBSRflagship project 1.5. 11 The Russian component of the EU-Russianshared environmental applicability of the Convention on assessmentof environmental impact in the trans-boundary context (the EspooConvention) to the Nord Stream gas pipeline and other similar8European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Annual report 04.10.2010. Annex 1.Summary of Implementation, pp. 71–72. http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperate/baltic/documents_en.cfm#2(Home page of European Commission; visited 10.05.2013.).9Ibid, p. 72.10Baltic Sea Action Plan. Adopted by Helsinki Commission by 15.11.2007. Krakow, Poland, p. 6.11Ibid., p. 11.
60Alexander Serguninprojects has been held. Russia promised to ratify the Espoo and(similar) Aarhus conventions.••Tourism. EUSBSR priority No. 12 outlines an environmentallyfriendlytourism strategy in the region that aims at the harmonizationof standards, the development of similar projects in different regions,joint marketing of the region and cooperation on projects. 12••Education, youth. The ongoing Erasmus-Mundus and Tempus-Tacis 13programs are quite helpful in developing student mobility, interuniversitycooperation and the reform of the Russian higher educationsystem in line with the Bologna process standards. Accordingto the EUSBSR flagship project 12.13, a Baltic youth resource centreshould be established to include Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldovaand, potentially, Caucasus, in cooperative schemes. 14••Visa regime liberalization. The BSR has become a testing groundfor EU-Russian visa facilitation regime “exercises”. On 14 December2011, the Russian-Polish agreement on a visa-free regime for theresidents of the Kaliningrad “oblast” and two Polish border regions(Warmian-Masurian and Pomeranian “voivodeships”) was signed.Notably, the initial plan was to establish a visa-free regime onlywithin the 30-kilometer area from both sides of the border, butMoscow and Warsaw managed to extend this practice to the entireKaliningrad “oblast” and the afore-mentioned Polish “voivodeships”.This agreement is seen by Russian and European experts as a modelto be replicated in other border regions.It should be noted, however, that some of the above projects remainonly on paper. Issues such as energy cooperation or trade, visa, customs andborder regimes are basically discussed and solved either at the EU-Russiatop level, or on a country-to-country basis rather than within the EUSBSRframework.Despite the above-mentioned criticism of the Strategy, the EU did notrevise the EUSBSR radically in the case of Russia. The Commission’s communication(23 March 2012) and Council conclusions (26 June 2012) on thecompletion of the review of the EUSBSR simply mentioned that cooperation12Baltic Sea Action Plan. Adopted by Helsinki Commission by 15.11.2007. Krakow, Poland, p. 56.13To be completed in 2013.14Ibid., p. 59.
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