PoPulationand Public HealtH etHics

policy
through outdoor smoking, any legal restriction of such behaviour is morally
wrong. The second argument, let us call it the ‘Stigma and Injustice’ argument,
is that the intervention is likely to increase injustice, through the production
of additional stigma towards minority groups in society that already
suffer from disadvantage. The worry is that we know that members of such
groups are more likely to smoke, and so this will have a differentially negative
impact upon them. Both of these arguments, however, are problematic.
1. The ‘Harm to Others’ argument
There are a number of potential objections that might be raised to the argument
that it is wrong to ban ‘outdoor’ public smoking based on the harm
it might, or might not, cause to others. First, we might doubt whether it is
really true that there is no evidence of potential harm to others. Can we assume
that the issue is different if we distinguish outside space from inside
space? Presumably, the relevant difference is supposed to be that smoking in
an outdoor space is much less likely to affect in a negative way other peoples’
health, because smoke rises into the ‘fresh air.’ However, it is surely unlikely
that smoke will rise straight up into the atmosphere rather than, say, be blown
towards the next group of persons on a crowded beach. The very fact you can
smell your neighbours’ smoking on the next picnic bench suggests this is too
simple. If so, then all of the substantial evidence we have about harm from
smoking is relevant (especially the evidence about the benefits from reduced
smoking in public places). 3 It does indeed seem intuitively true that there is
likely to be less impact than if smoking occurred in a
The very fact you can
smell your neighbours’
smoking on the next
picnic bench suggests
this is too simple.
confined space. However, it does not follow from this
that it is, therefore, safe. Given that the general negative
health risks from smoking are well known and
clearly established, the burden of proof should not rest
with those seeking to restrict smoking. After all, we
are talking about smoking in public places, even if it is
outside, not restrictions on smoking in private spaces.
Second, the notion of ‘harm’ should not be interpreted too narrowly. The presumption
in the case seems to be that only direct physical harm to others
will count as harm. Yet there are other harms as well. If it is more likely that
others will continue smoking or current non-smokers will begin smoking if
they are surrounded by smokers, might this not constitute a harm? There is
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