Autobiography - The Galindo Group

Ram Galindo THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN Page 116
enough to damage the components, like copper or silver wires or other alloys in an
assembly. It binds them together without changing their electric conductivity and almost
as firmly as if they were welded. Because of its relatively low energy requirement, the
process is fairly cheap.
During the military rebuilding of our defenses in the early 1980s Bera de Bolivia, via
Canadian, British and other intermediaries, supplied a good part of the solder wire
needed by U.S. industries for electronics work. This was our small contribution to the
restoration of the arsenals of freedom. We also increased the value added by Bolivian
production to tin, lead and antimony. We provided new sources of employment and
commerce and, not least, with the generous royalties that we paid our Danish partners,
originated a new source of hard currency for Denmark. On a personal level, the
friendship and mutual respect that grew between Boris and me was another form of
non-monetary compensation that I greatly appreciated until his death in December
1999. In another example of the strength of parental bonds so ingrained in my family,
my father represented me as chairman of the board of Bera de Bolivia when I couldn’t
attend, which was most of the time since I already lived in Texas by then.
Swept by the conservative wave spreading from across the Atlantic, by 1985 the Danish
government had began to somewhat turn away from the most expensive corporate
welfare policies of its socialist zenith. Without special subsidies, some of the so-called
private companies were not able to survive. Such was the case of our initial partner -
Paul Bergsoe A.S. The other partner - the East Asiatic Company, could not, or would
not, go at it alone. Perhaps due to their pressing solvency problems, or perhaps due to
the decline of our market, in a move not consonant with either the partnership
agreement or solid business ethics, our Danish partners, without consulting us, sold
their controlling interest in the company to a consortium of our local factory employees.
Boris and I were left as minority partners in an organization that had suddenly lost the
support of the Danish and Bolivian governments, had become disconnected from its
former markets and had undergone new management. In the minds of the new
managers, the raison d’etre of the company was to become their permanent source of
employment as opposed to also giving a return to its stockholders. It was November
1987 before we could sell our shares to the new managers. This was possible only as a
result of my extended efforts during a couple of trips I made to La Paz. It was an
unexpected exit from our enterprise; but all in all my experience with the tin alloys
initiative turned out to be very economically and personally rewarding. When it was all
said and done, as it happened when I sold CGL, I also wound up selling this company
to my former employees.
Following the death of President Barrientos, Bolivia nationalized the oil companies in
1969. I decided to visit Ecuador and Argentina, the re-assigned destinations of their
former executives. I did not want to move there personally. My plan was to establish a
joint venture with a local engineer and set up a project office in each country. I realized
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