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Appendix CASE ONE - Collection Point® | The Total Digital Asset ...

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Sir Augustus Stephenson and the Prosecution of Offences Act of 1884 203<br />

cattle thieves. 6 <strong>The</strong>se rewards were not payable in the event of acquittals<br />

and bore no relationship to the actual cost of prosecution. <strong>The</strong> first<br />

example of an allowance from public funds to cover the actual cost<br />

of prosecution was an Act of 1752 (25 Geo. II c. 36) which permitted<br />

the successful prosecutor of a felony to recover 'a reasonable amount of<br />

compensation for his expenses' from county funds. Subsequent legislation,<br />

and most notably Bennet's Act of 1818 (50 Geo. Ill c. 70) extended this<br />

principle to cover failed prosecutions, allowances to witnesses and costs<br />

incurred at preliminary investigations. This shift from the private purse to<br />

the local rates, even if occasionally helped by the Crown, was not popular.<br />

In 1836, following a parliamentary inquiry into local rates, it was agreed<br />

by a vote of the House, rather than an Act of Parliament, that half of<br />

the reasonable expenses of prosecuting felonies might be recovered from<br />

the Exchequer. A decade later, in 1846, this compromise was extended<br />

to cover the full cost. Not only did such a concession require an annual<br />

vote but it left a long list of excluded offences including many of rising<br />

concern to the society of early Victorian England, including conspiracy<br />

to obtain by false pretences, keeping disorderly houses and libel. It was,<br />

nevertheless, not these exclusions which exercised early Victorian lawreformers<br />

but the lack of equity and the inefficiency of the prosecutorial<br />

system.<br />

When, in 1856, a Select Committee reported on a proposed Bill to appoint<br />

a public prosecutor the prevailing system was criticized in roundly utilitarian<br />

terms. Lord Brougham declared in his evidence: 7<br />

<strong>The</strong> existing law is by no means as effectual as it ought to be: the duty of prosecution<br />

is usually irksome, inconvenient and burthensome. <strong>The</strong> injured party would often<br />

rather forego the prosecution than incur expense of time, labour and money.<br />

Entrusting the conduct of the prosecution to a private individual opens a wide<br />

door to bribery, collusion and illegal compromise.<br />

<strong>The</strong> law laid no onus on either the Crown or the individual victim<br />

to prosecute a criminal offender although both had been, in different<br />

senses, the victims of that offence. On the other hand it was open to<br />

any private individual to prosecute and, under the legislation referred<br />

to above, for courts to award expenses. It was this 'privilege' which<br />

permitted the emerging police authorities progressively to assume the<br />

role of prosecutor in the 1840s and 1850s. It was an uncertain expedient<br />

which depended heavily on the resources of the local police authority.<br />

In the relatively well-organized Metropolitan area the Home Office itself<br />

disposed of an extensive police force. By 1860 there were more than two<br />

policemen to every 1000 of London's population, a Criminal Investigation<br />

6 Ibid., appendix.<br />

7 'Report of the Select Committee to whom the subject of the Prosecutions Bill was referred . . .'<br />

(May 1856), iii, Parl. Papers, vii (1856).

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