manual for social impact assessment of land-based ... - Forest Trends
manual for social impact assessment of land-based ... - Forest Trends
manual for social impact assessment of land-based ... - Forest Trends
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face a choice and dilemma in terms <strong>of</strong> working with (and potentially rein<strong>for</strong>cing) existing <strong>social</strong><br />
structures and traditional norms, or pushing <strong>for</strong> more trans<strong>for</strong>mational <strong>social</strong> change.<br />
Costs and benefits <strong>of</strong> carbon projects may affect households and segments <strong>of</strong> rural society differently.<br />
As noted above, in the case <strong>of</strong> expanded woodlots in Uganda the costs <strong>of</strong> restricted access or production<br />
may fall more heavily on poor households that rely on customary use <strong>of</strong> <strong>land</strong> or <strong>for</strong>ests. The distribution<br />
<strong>of</strong> project benefits depends in large part on who participates. Eligibility requirements <strong>for</strong> participation,<br />
such as minimum <strong>land</strong>holding size, credit, or <strong>for</strong>mal property rights, may exclude the poorest rural<br />
people—including smallholders and <strong>land</strong>less—from taking part in carbon projects and their benefits<br />
(Tacconi et al. 2009; Grieg-Gran et al. 2005). 19<br />
For example, the PROFAFOR carbon sequestration project in Ecuador set the minimum plot size at 50<br />
hectares, thus excluding some poor smallholders from participating (Wunder 2008). In the TFGB project<br />
in Uganda, “the availability <strong>of</strong> <strong>land</strong> and capital” <strong>of</strong> local farmers was seen as a determining factor <strong>for</strong><br />
participation, and smallholders without idle <strong>land</strong> faced the difficult decision <strong>of</strong> planting trees <strong>for</strong> carbon<br />
<strong>for</strong>estry or cultivating food crops (German et al. 2009). Likewise, evidence from some PES schemes<br />
shows that requirements <strong>for</strong> participation led to benefits being channeled largely to the already<br />
20<br />
relatively well-<strong>of</strong>f. Selective enrollment or the concentration <strong>of</strong> carbon benefits may lead to jealousies<br />
and grievances among non-participants, and negatively affect intra-community relations and the local<br />
standing <strong>of</strong> the project (Wunder 2008).<br />
Project Design and the ‘Rules <strong>of</strong> the Game’<br />
The <strong>social</strong> outcomes and <strong>impact</strong>s generated vary according to the design and context <strong>of</strong> each project as<br />
well as the differences between and within communities. Specifically, each project’s policies and<br />
governance (its ‘rules <strong>of</strong> the game’) are key determining factors. 21<br />
They include types <strong>of</strong> compensation,<br />
how local stakeholders participate in project governance, modes and rates <strong>of</strong> payment, risk<br />
arrangements, and eligibility requirements <strong>for</strong> participation. Benefit sharing systems can strengthen or<br />
19<br />
The willingness, ability, or eligibility people to participate in carbon projects may be affected by a variety <strong>of</strong> legal,<br />
economic, socio-cultural, and ecological factors (Jindal 2010; Pagiola et al. 2004; and Grieg-Gran et al. 2005).A<br />
review <strong>of</strong> eight case studies <strong>of</strong> PES schemes in Africa, Asia, and Latin America concluded that poorer households<br />
were allowed access to the schemes, but <strong>land</strong> tenure was <strong>of</strong>ten a constraint to participation (Tacconi et al. 2009).<br />
On the other hand, Bond et al. (2009) found that small-scale farmers with in<strong>for</strong>mal <strong>land</strong> tenure have been able to<br />
participate in some PES schemes.<br />
20<br />
A case study <strong>of</strong> the Costa Rican national PES system found that in one watershed a large number <strong>of</strong> participants<br />
were relatively well-<strong>of</strong>f, and derived more than half their total income from outside the farm (Grieg-Gran et al.<br />
2005). The initial failure <strong>of</strong> Costa Rica’s PES scheme to involve poorer farmers and <strong>land</strong> users (who held no <strong>for</strong>mal<br />
<strong>land</strong> titles) led the country to develop specific measures to lower or remove barriers to participation (Bond et al.<br />
2009).<br />
21<br />
National policies and governance as well as the international climate regime are also determining factors <strong>of</strong><br />
these ‘rules’.<br />
Social Impact Assessment <strong>of</strong> Land-Based Carbon Projects (1.0) – Part II | 89