No. 5-99-0830 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ... - Appellate.net

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F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1992). In this case, Ryles and Hunter contributed no expertise; rather, they served merely as conduits through whom plaintiffs’ counsel funneled to the jury reams of documents about which Ryles and Hunter lacked any personal knowledge. Admission of Ryles’ and Hunter’s uninformed testimony prejudiced State Farm by giving the jurors the impression that the court had shifted to these “experts” the jurors’ responsibility for deciding the case. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 12, at 51 (5th ed. 1999); Wakeford v. Rodehouse Restaurants, 223 Ill.App.3d 31, 48 (5th Dist. 1991), aff’d, 154 Ill.2d 543 (1992). Exploiting that impression, Ryles actually told the jury that it was his job to weigh the evidence and to determine whether the burden of proof had been met. R. 4864 (“I decided what the preponderance of the evidence was”); R. 4919 (“I don’t believe [State Farm has] sufficient evidence to show that these parts are of like kind and quality”). The dangers of allowing a witness to assume the mantle of “super-juror,” Haas v. Abrahamson, 705 F. Supp. 1370, 1375 (E.D. Wis. 1989), aff’d, 910 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1990), are convincingly demonstrated by Ryles’ own testimony: he got the burden of proof exactly backwards, advising the jury to find State Farm liable because State Farm had allegedly failed to prove by “a preponderance of the evidence . . . that these parts are equal to or better than OEM parts.” R. 4864. While allowing Ryles and Hunter to improperly “interpret” State Farm documents, the court inexplicably refused to allow State Farm to explain its own documents. For example, throughout the trial plaintiffs harped on a State Farm memo containing the following sentence: “A pick-up truck might make better sense for the usage of [non-OEM parts] than a Mercedes.” PX 433. In opening argument, plaintiffs claimed that this memo -100-
eflected a policy of “discrimination” in favor of luxury cars, and asked “why” State Farm would discriminate if non-OEM parts were really as good as OEM parts. R. 4447. Ryles interpreted this memo as showing State Farm’s belief that “some policyholders are created more equal than others.” R. 4783. Hunter testified that the discrimination supposedly documented in the memo confirmed that non-OEM parts are inferior. R. 6394-95. State Farm called Bill Hardt, the author of the memo, as a witness to answer plaintiffs’ rhetorical question as to “why” the memo was written. Hardt was about to do so when plaintiffs objected on the ground that “the document speaks for itself.” R. 9262-65. Even though Ryles and Hunter had opined about what the document meant without any personal knowledge whatsoever, the court made the astonishing ruling that Hardt — who wrote the document — could not explain what he really meant. Id. 45/ Second, the circuit court also abused its discretion by allowing plaintiffs to make arguments and offer evidence impugning State Farm’s character and motives in specifying non-OEM parts, while at the same time prohibiting State Farm from telling the jury why it had adopted a policy of specifying non-OEM parts. Prior to trial, the circuit court precluded State Farm from offering any evidence to show that its practices with respect to non-OEM parts were motivated by a desire to hold down repair costs and thereby allow State Farm to hold down premiums and increase dividends. C. 28974. State Farm was not allowed to 45/ In an offer of proof, Hardt explained that he distinguished between a pick-up truck and a Mercedes because non-OEM parts are more available for pick-ups (which have a relatively high market share) and are therefore “tried and tested” and likely to be of higher quality than non-OEM parts for a Mercedes. R. 9478-80. Hardt, who has driven a pick-up truck for 35 years, R. 9267, stated that he in no way intended to discriminate based on wealth. R. 9478-80. -101-
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No. 5-99-0830 IN THE APPELLATE COUR
Page 3 and 4:
Charles Hester Enters. v. Illinois
Page 5 and 6:
In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 70
Page 7 and 8:
State v. Piedmont Funding Corp., 38
Page 9 and 10:
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940
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1. Plaintiffs’ Body Shop Witnesse
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People v. Clayton, 302 Ill.App.3d 2
Page 15 and 16:
VPHI, Inc. v. National Educ. Traini
Page 17 and 18:
Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 823 F.2
Page 19 and 20:
Zekman v. Direct Am. Marketers, Inc
Page 21 and 22:
Malooley v. Alice, 251 Ill.App.3d 5
Page 23 and 24:
NATURE OF THE CASE This is an appea
Page 25 and 26:
STATUTES INVOLVED Relevant portions
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to its “pre-loss condition.” DX
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OEM parts. 5/ At least two states
Page 31 and 32:
paid the difference in cost out of
Page 33 and 34:
epair estimate specified only OEM p
Page 35 and 36:
potential class members whose names
Page 37 and 38:
member’s vehicle other than those
Page 39 and 40:
William Anderton, who had previousl
Page 41 and 42:
categorically inferior and, in fact
Page 43 and 44:
specified on their repair estimates
Page 45 and 46:
Second, plaintiffs sought “instal
Page 47 and 48:
parts] are inferior.” R. 12539 (
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had an adequate remedy at law if St
Page 51 and 52:
loss condition. Instead of requirin
Page 53 and 54:
ARGUMENT I. Class Certification Vio
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members.” Slimack v. Country Life
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of evidence State Farm would be ent
Page 59 and 60:
that are incongruous with the effic
Page 61 and 62:
fenders to its pre-loss condition.
Page 63 and 64:
a result of Allstate’s specificat
Page 65 and 66:
insurance regulators and consumer a
Page 67 and 68:
have been the overwhelming predomin
Page 69 and 70:
some class members and the issue of
Page 71 and 72: not sooner, that plaintiffs could n
Page 73 and 74: explained above, class members who
Page 75 and 76: Even if the court had been right in
Page 77 and 78: value” of “parts at the time of
Page 79 and 80: page 7, supra. All of these statute
Page 81 and 82: (7th Cir. 1995) (decertifying class
Page 83 and 84: As the circuit court itself recogni
Page 85 and 86: the same shortcut, arguing — just
Page 87 and 88: epresentatives who appeared at tria
Page 89 and 90: — was injured by the alleged dece
Page 91 and 92: Litig., 182 F.R.D. at 225. Basic fa
Page 93 and 94: Meineke’s continued financial via
Page 95 and 96: this decision, plaintiffs were excu
Page 97 and 98: corresponding OEM part. R. 7169. In
Page 99 and 100: Mathur’s testimony was particular
Page 101 and 102: end of the day, Mathur conceded tha
Page 103 and 104: Zimny, 256 Ill.App.3d 386, 390-91 (
Page 105 and 106: the jury was focused on the wrong i
Page 107 and 108: to its pre-loss condition.” R. 12
Page 109 and 110: quality of non-OEM parts. See Baltu
Page 111 and 112: which is not surprising because the
Page 113 and 114: In this case, plaintiffs’ experts
Page 115 and 116: Bender could not swear that the non
Page 117 and 118: OEM part construction “had some d
Page 119 and 120: theory, even non-OEM parts that are
Page 121: of his training or expertise”). P
Page 125 and 126: “speak up for justice.” R. 1301
Page 127 and 128: 12984-85. The perversion of ostensi
Page 129 and 130: Polywheels company makes both the O
Page 131 and 132: parts — was simply a made-for-lit
Page 133 and 134: In contrast, each of the 47 other s
Page 135 and 136: occurred outside Illinois. 51/ In t
Page 137 and 138: laws of the State where the policy
Page 139 and 140: This Court should follow the weight
Page 141 and 142: other states, Illinois cannot apply
Page 143 and 144: state’s law when it is not within
Page 145 and 146: headquartered in Michigan); Endo, 1
Page 147 and 148: for this Court to alter that author
Page 149 and 150: y using parts of like kind and qual
Page 151 and 152: plaintiffs’ failure to identify a
Page 153 and 154: percentage of the class (New York a
Page 155 and 156: committing fraud: if all non-OEM pa
Page 157 and 158: specification damages they had soug
Page 159 and 160: A. It Is Unconstitutional To Punish
Page 161 and 162: that will subject him to punishment
Page 163 and 164: fact benefitted from access to non-
Page 165 and 166: deterrence and therefore must be va
Page 167 and 168: 517 U.S. at 576. This case is not i
Page 169 and 170: either higher premiums or the incre
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