No. 5-99-0830 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ... - Appellate.net

those transactions can in no way be said to “affect[]” the people of Illinois.
Even if ICFA’s geographic limitation were not clear, the settled rule in Illinois is that,
“when a statute . . . is silent as to extraterritorial effect, there is a presumption that it has
none.” Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post No. 2665, 43 Ill.2d 1, 6 (1969). Use of “general
words” such as “any” or “all” is insufficient to overcome the presumption against giving
statutes extraterritorial effect; the statute must use specific language to justify applying it to
conduct or injuries in another state. Dur-Ite Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 394 Ill. 338, 349
(1946). Moreover, even when a statute should be “liberally construed to carry out its
beneficent object,” it does not apply to injuries outside the state absent an express legislative
directive. Union Bridge & Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 287 Ill. 396, 400 (1919).
The prerogative of applying Illinois law extraterritorially (subject to constitutional
limitations) resides in the legislature, not the courts. See Dur-Ite, 394 Ill. at 349 (“this court
. . . declines to arrogate to itself legislative power under the guise of tortuous statutory
construction”). Because the General Assembly did not unambiguously provide that out-ofstate
transactions with in-state companies are governed by ICFA (and, indeed, limited ICFA
to conduct affecting Illinois residents), the circuit court erred in applying ICFA to the claims
of out-of-state class members.
Construing ICFA’s plain language and faithful to the presumption against
extraterritoriality, the overwhelming majority of reported decisions addressing the issue have
held that out-of-state residents may not bring an ICFA claim based on transactions that
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