No. 5-99-0830 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ... - Appellate.net

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c. Plaintiffs’ Attempt To Overcome The Inherently Individual Nature Of The Inquiry By Seeking To Litigate The Case On Behalf Of The Class As A Whole Failed As A Matter Of Law. Plaintiffs recognized that it would be impossible to try this case as a class action if they were required to prove the pre-loss condition of each class member’s vehicle and the inferiority of each of the tens of thousands of different kinds of non-OEM parts that were actually installed. They persuaded the circuit court to certify the class by promising to show, through generalized proof, that all non-OEM crash parts were so inferior that they were inherently incapable of meeting the contractual standard. A. 31. The circuit court’s decision to certify the class based on these representations was a clear abuse of discretion. It was obvious from the outset that plaintiffs would never be able to sustain the burden they had undertaken. There is no way anyone could possibly establish, through common proof, that 33,000 different types of parts produced over 10½ years by different factories out of different materials failed to restore 4.7 million different vehicles to pre-loss condition. Moreover, the fact that the majority of states expressly permit insurance companies to use non-OEM parts to meet the same contractual obligations at issue here — and that there is not a single state that prohibits insurance companies from doing so — is proof, in and of itself, that non-OEM parts cannot be categorically condemned. For if, as plaintiffs contend, there were no “like kind and quality” non-OEM parts, state legislatures, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (denying class certification because airplane performance varied depending on alterations made to kits and how purchasers finished planes with component parts made from different manufacturers); Zehnder v. Ginsburg & Ginsburg Architects, 678 N.Y.S.2d 376, 377 (App. Div. 1998) (individual questions of law and fact predominated in condominium owners’ suit to recover damages based on faulty construction of units, where units were not of uniform design). -42-
insurance regulators and consumer advocates would hardly support legislation allowing insurance companies to specify those parts. In any event, even if the court had been free to accept plaintiffs’ representations about what they intended to prove, it was error to certify the class in the face of State Farm’s repeated protestations that it had a right to defend each class member’s claim based on the quality of the parts that were actually installed on the vehicles in question. While plaintiffs made a choice to present generalized proof, State Farm had a right under both the Illinois and United States Constitutions to present a full-scale defense to each individual class member’s claim. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972) (“Due process requires that there be an opportunity to present every available defense”). To deny a defendant the right to “present a full defense on the issues would violate due process.” Western Elec. Co. v. Stern, 544 F.2d 1196, 1199 (3d Cir. 1976). The court in Stern concluded that, even if plaintiffs could “make out a prima facie case” of a Title VII violation “without introducing evidence on individual cases,” “defendants must be allowed to present any relevant rebuttal evidence they choose, including evidence that there was no discrimination against one or more members of the class.” Id. (emphasis added). So too, in this case, even if plaintiffs could have found a way to present their prima facie breach of contract case on a classwide basis, State Farm was entitled to defend itself by presenting evidence about individual repairs to prove that it did not breach its contracts with particular members of the class. Because that kind of detailed, individual proof cannot feasibly be presented in the context of a class action, it was an abuse of discretion — and a deprivation of State Farm’s state and federal due process rights — to certify the class. -43-
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No. 5-99-0830 IN THE APPELLATE COUR
Page 3 and 4:
Charles Hester Enters. v. Illinois
Page 5 and 6:
In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 70
Page 7 and 8:
State v. Piedmont Funding Corp., 38
Page 9 and 10:
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940
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1. Plaintiffs’ Body Shop Witnesse
Page 13 and 14: People v. Clayton, 302 Ill.App.3d 2
Page 15 and 16: VPHI, Inc. v. National Educ. Traini
Page 17 and 18: Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 823 F.2
Page 19 and 20: Zekman v. Direct Am. Marketers, Inc
Page 21 and 22: Malooley v. Alice, 251 Ill.App.3d 5
Page 23 and 24: NATURE OF THE CASE This is an appea
Page 25 and 26: STATUTES INVOLVED Relevant portions
Page 27 and 28: to its “pre-loss condition.” DX
Page 29 and 30: OEM parts. 5/ At least two states
Page 31 and 32: paid the difference in cost out of
Page 33 and 34: epair estimate specified only OEM p
Page 35 and 36: potential class members whose names
Page 37 and 38: member’s vehicle other than those
Page 39 and 40: William Anderton, who had previousl
Page 41 and 42: categorically inferior and, in fact
Page 43 and 44: specified on their repair estimates
Page 45 and 46: Second, plaintiffs sought “instal
Page 47 and 48: parts] are inferior.” R. 12539 (
Page 49 and 50: had an adequate remedy at law if St
Page 51 and 52: loss condition. Instead of requirin
Page 53 and 54: ARGUMENT I. Class Certification Vio
Page 55 and 56: members.” Slimack v. Country Life
Page 57 and 58: of evidence State Farm would be ent
Page 59 and 60: that are incongruous with the effic
Page 61 and 62: fenders to its pre-loss condition.
Page 63: a result of Allstate’s specificat
Page 67 and 68: have been the overwhelming predomin
Page 69 and 70: some class members and the issue of
Page 71 and 72: not sooner, that plaintiffs could n
Page 73 and 74: explained above, class members who
Page 75 and 76: Even if the court had been right in
Page 77 and 78: value” of “parts at the time of
Page 79 and 80: page 7, supra. All of these statute
Page 81 and 82: (7th Cir. 1995) (decertifying class
Page 83 and 84: As the circuit court itself recogni
Page 85 and 86: the same shortcut, arguing — just
Page 87 and 88: epresentatives who appeared at tria
Page 89 and 90: — was injured by the alleged dece
Page 91 and 92: Litig., 182 F.R.D. at 225. Basic fa
Page 93 and 94: Meineke’s continued financial via
Page 95 and 96: this decision, plaintiffs were excu
Page 97 and 98: corresponding OEM part. R. 7169. In
Page 99 and 100: Mathur’s testimony was particular
Page 101 and 102: end of the day, Mathur conceded tha
Page 103 and 104: Zimny, 256 Ill.App.3d 386, 390-91 (
Page 105 and 106: the jury was focused on the wrong i
Page 107 and 108: to its pre-loss condition.” R. 12
Page 109 and 110: quality of non-OEM parts. See Baltu
Page 111 and 112: which is not surprising because the
Page 113 and 114: In this case, plaintiffs’ experts
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Bender could not swear that the non
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OEM part construction “had some d
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theory, even non-OEM parts that are
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of his training or expertise”). P
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eflected a policy of “discriminat
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“speak up for justice.” R. 1301
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12984-85. The perversion of ostensi
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Polywheels company makes both the O
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parts — was simply a made-for-lit
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In contrast, each of the 47 other s
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occurred outside Illinois. 51/ In t
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laws of the State where the policy
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This Court should follow the weight
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other states, Illinois cannot apply
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state’s law when it is not within
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headquartered in Michigan); Endo, 1
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for this Court to alter that author
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y using parts of like kind and qual
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plaintiffs’ failure to identify a
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percentage of the class (New York a
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committing fraud: if all non-OEM pa
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specification damages they had soug
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A. It Is Unconstitutional To Punish
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that will subject him to punishment
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fact benefitted from access to non-
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deterrence and therefore must be va
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517 U.S. at 576. This case is not i
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either higher premiums or the incre
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