No. 5-99-0830 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ... - Appellate.net

economic loss. R. 7220-21 (Q: “That was given to you by plaintiffs’ lawyers; isn’t that
right?” A: “That is correct.”). Mathur assumed that plaintiffs’ theory was “legal” rather than
economic. R. 7221, 7229, 7233.
In fact, however, there is no such thing as presumed “legal” damages for breach of
contract. Plaintiffs may recover in a breach of contract action only if they can prove actual
damages, that is, economic losses suffered as a result of the breach. See Economy Fire &
Cas. Co. v. GAB Bus. Serv. Inc., 155 Ill.App.3d 197, 201 (3d Dist. 1987) (plaintiff must
show that “loss or damages resulted directly” from the breach); Prevendar v. Thonn, 166
Ill.App.3d 30, 36 (2d Dist. 1988) (same). Thus, a contracting party who has received the
benefit of his bargain has no standing to seek damages. Yet under plaintiffs’ specification
theory, even those class members who received OEM parts at no additional cost — who
plaintiffs conceded received the benefit of their bargain, C. 17018 — were entitled to
specification damages. For that reason alone, the circuit court should have rejected
plaintiffs’ theory of “specification” damages as a matter of law.
Allowing Mathur to instruct the jury from the witness stand about the recoverability
of “legal” damages was also an abuse of discretion. Experts may not testify about the law;
that is for the judge to decide. Nor are they permitted to serve as mouthpieces for theories
concocted by lawyers; instead, they must contribute a professional opinion that adds to the
case. See, e.g., Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat’l Bank, 877 F.2d 1333, 1340 (7th
Cir. 1989) (observing that “ukase in the guise of expertise is a plague in contemporary
litigation” and advising that “[j]udges should not be buffaloed by unreasoned expert
opinions”).
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