The Palestinian Economy. Theoretical and Practical Challenges

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Proceedings “The Palestinian Economy: Theoretical and Practical Challenges” 337 6. Concluding remarks In this paper we analyzed the effect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on child labour and school attendance of Palestinian children (10-14 years) in the West Bank between the beginning of the Second Intifada and the end of 2006. Our main result is that an increase in the number of closure days increases the probability of child labour and (weakly) reduces school attendance. We also considered some possible regional, district and household level channels through which the conflict may have affected children’s status. The evidence suggests that the increase in the number of closure days reduces households’ income and the probability for the father to be employed in Israel while it increases the number of unemployed in the household. All these outcomes are in turn positively correlated with the probability of child labour. We also have documented that the negative effect of closures on children’s status is not limited – as one may expect – to households with the father being employed in Israel. Indeed, our analysis indicates that the worsening of the local labour market conditions induced by the closures of borders tends to increase child labour and reduce school attendance independently from the household’s characteristics. When choosing which security measure to implement, one should take into consideration all its (intended and unintended) effects if the social costs of the conflict have to be minimized.
338 Di Maio – Nandi References Abadie, A., Gardeazabal, J., (2003). The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country. American Economic Review, vol. 93 (1), pp. 113-132. Akresh, R., de Walque, D. (2010). Armed Conflict and Schooling: Evidence from the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming Al Kafri, S., (2003). Impact of Israeli Measures on Palestinian Child Labor and Schooling. ERF Working Paper Series n. 215. Angrist, J.D., (1996). Short-Run Demand for Palestinian Labor. Journal of Labor Economics, vol.14 (3), pp. 425-453. Aranki, T.N., (2004). The Effect of Israeli Closure Policy on Wage Earnings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Orebro University Working Paper Series n. 4. B’Tselem, (2007). Annual Report: Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. Basu, K., Van, P.H., (1998). The Economics of Child Labor. American Economic Review, vol. 88, pp. 412-427. Beegle, K., Dehejia, R.H., Gatti, R., (2006). Child Labor and Agricultural Shocks. Journal of Development Economics, vol. 81, pp. 80-96. Birzeit University Development Studies Programme, UNICEF, (2004). The Children of Palestine in the Labour Market (A qualitative participatory study). Blatmann, C., Annan, J., (2010). The Consequences of Child Soldiering. The Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming. Chamarbagwala, R., Morn, H.E., (2010). The Human Capital Consequences of Civil War: Evidence from Guatemala. Journal of Development Economics, forthcoming. Duryea, S., Arends-Kuenning, M., (2003). School Attendance, Child Labor and Local Labor Market Fuctuations in Urban Brazil. World Development, vol. 31 (7), pp. 1165-1178. Duryea, S., Lam, D., Levison, D., (2007). Effect of Economics Shocks on Children’s Employment and Schooling in Brazil. Journal of Development Economics, vol. 88, pp. 188-214. Edmonds, E., (2008). Child Labour. In: Schultz, T.P., Strauss, J. (eds.), Handbook of Development Economics, vol. 4, Ch. 57, pp. 3607-3709.
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The Palestinian Economy Theoretical
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VOLUME II
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246 Zagha 1. Introduction The local
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248 Zagha and groups in political d
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250 Zagha drawbacks in the politica
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252 Zagha it is not surprising that
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256 Zagha social norms sharply dist
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258 Zagha Bird (1995) puts it, info
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260 Zagha intergovernmental fiscal
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262 Zagha low rate flat tax levied
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270 Zagha a final account report of
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274 Zagha • Management of LGU ass
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276 Zagha Figure 2: Local Governmen
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278 Zagha In summary, what the data
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