The Palestinian Economy. Theoretical and Practical Challenges
The Palestinian Economy. Theoretical and Practical Challenges
The Palestinian Economy. Theoretical and Practical Challenges
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424<br />
Olivera<br />
provisions – in particular those regarding movement <strong>and</strong> access of goods <strong>and</strong> labour – are<br />
legally vague <strong>and</strong> subject to the interpretation of the Israeli Government.<br />
Looking at trade issues, Palestine appears as a province of Israel, however goods’<br />
movements are not free <strong>and</strong> markets are not perfectly integrated due to Israeli restrictions.<br />
Palestine does not have a complete economic sovereignty <strong>and</strong> the commercial<br />
asymmetries between the two countries are very large. <strong>Palestinian</strong>s depend greatly on<br />
Israel for trade flows. Imports from Israel accounted for 73% of total <strong>Palestinian</strong> imports<br />
in 2003, while Israeli imports from Palestine accounted for only 0.8% of their total<br />
imports in 2004. Besides, because of Israel’s control of all access routes to Palestine,<br />
<strong>Palestinian</strong> trade with third countries depends thoroughly on Israel.<br />
As regards currency issues, the <strong>Palestinian</strong> Monetary Authority (PMA), although in<br />
charge of regulating domestic financial institutions, cannot run an independent monetary<br />
policy due to the lack of a <strong>Palestinian</strong> currency, so there is also a de facto monetary<br />
union. <strong>The</strong> Protocol recognized that the New Israeli Shekel (NIS) was to be “one of the<br />
circulating currencies in the Areas, <strong>and</strong> legally serve as means of payment for all<br />
purposes including official transactions”. Such sanctioned use of the NIS as a means of<br />
exchange in the Territory results in a lack of a <strong>Palestinian</strong> national currency, giving rise to<br />
the so-called “currency issue”. Thus, Palestine suffers a sizeable loss of seignorage<br />
revenue. Moreover, this currency issue seriously constrains the functions of the PMA <strong>and</strong><br />
prevents any possibility of exchange rate policies.<br />
As well as the trade <strong>and</strong> currency issues, the <strong>Palestinian</strong> dependence on the Israeli<br />
economy is present in all major economic areas, from fiscal issues to the dependence on<br />
Israeli labour markets.<br />
As regards the workforce, labour flows from Palestine to Israel have been one of the<br />
main sources of growth in the <strong>Palestinian</strong> economy, <strong>and</strong> these flows have also been<br />
highly variable depending on the security situation <strong>and</strong> the decisions of the Government<br />
of Israel, with a consequent sharp reduction after the beginning of the Second Intifada.<br />
<strong>The</strong> percentage of <strong>Palestinian</strong> employees working in Israel fell from an average of 16% in<br />
1994-99 to 7% in 2003-2005. By 2007 a man in the West Bank only had a 77% chance of<br />
being employed compared to 1999. Based on the level determined by the share of<br />
“Israeli” employment in total WBG employment in 1999-2000, the World Bank<br />
calculates that the number of <strong>Palestinian</strong> workers in Israel in 2005 could have been