The Palestinian Economy. Theoretical and Practical Challenges

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Proceedings “The Palestinian Economy: Theoretical and Practical Challenges” 379 (being always slightly higher in the WB than in GS, and lower in the case of tertiarylevel), suggesting that if these socioeconomic variables were distributed equally across income range, income-related inequity in the utilisation of health care (the HI index) would be, in general, about 30% lower than that observed. Also, it is worth noting that, although the pro-rich contributions of all these socioeconomic variables push further the “pro-poor” distribution from need in a “pro-rich” direction, this remains less than offset by the “very pro-poor” distribution of need in the case of primary-care, and therefore, income-related inequality in that case remains, overall, pro-poor. Figure 4.2: Decomposition of Overall Income-Related Inequality and Horizontal Inequity by Levels of Health Care West Bank (WB) Tertiary-care Secondary-care (inpatient) Secondary-care (outpatient) Primray-care Need Income Education Insurance Activity status Marital status Urban resid. Participation Condit. usage Other socioecon. Residual -0.15 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 Figure 2a: Contribution to inequality
380 Abu-Zaineh – Mataria Gaza Strip (GS) Tertiary-care Secondary-care (inpatient) Secondary-care (outpatient) Primray-care Need Income Education Insurance Activity status Marital status Place of Resid. Participation Condit. usage Other socioecon. Residual -0.15 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 Figure 2b: Contribution to inequality Turning to the second part of our decomposition, results, which are also presented in Table 4.1 and Figures 4.2 (a-b), clearly show that, in all the cases, the contributions to inequity attributed to heterogeneity in behaviour with respect to the SES of groups are far from being negligible: the I B index, which emerges globally “pro-rich”, amounts to nearly 30% of the total measured inequity (the HI index). Generally, this means that, given need and other individual characteristics, SES groups do behave differently with respect to both the “initial” decision of seeking health care, and the conditional “subsequent” contacts, and that this behaviour has a “pro-rich bias”. Indeed, the (partial) contribution of heterogeneity in behaviour (the I B index) to the total measured inequity is captured – separately from the distribution of explanatory variables by income – by the transition from a distribution where all SES subgroups, irrespective of their rank in the income distribution, are assumed to face the same parameter vectors (i.e., by imposing homogeneity in behaviour as embodied in parameters) to a distribution where these parameters are allowed to vary by income level. Therefore, the results on the estimated values of the I B index, as measured by the systematic deviations of the specific-group parameters from the population-wide effect, clearly reveal, not only the prevalence of heterogeneity in practice for a given need, but also a “pro-rich” character of such practice. Hence, this may also be interpreted, as before: inequity in utilisation of health care would, ceteris paribus, be about 30% lower, if there were no heterogeneity in behaviour across income – or if the effects of both need and non-need factors did not vary by SES.
Page 1 and 2:
The Palestinian Economy Theoretical
Page 3 and 4:
© Gianni Vaggi - Marco Missaglia -
Page 6:
VOLUME II
Page 9 and 10:
246 Zagha 1. Introduction The local
Page 11 and 12:
248 Zagha and groups in political d
Page 13 and 14:
250 Zagha drawbacks in the politica
Page 15 and 16:
252 Zagha it is not surprising that
Page 17 and 18:
254 Zagha economy (including expend
Page 19 and 20:
256 Zagha social norms sharply dist
Page 21 and 22:
258 Zagha Bird (1995) puts it, info
Page 23 and 24:
260 Zagha intergovernmental fiscal
Page 25 and 26:
262 Zagha low rate flat tax levied
Page 27 and 28:
264 Zagha need to be given access t
Page 29 and 30:
266 Zagha Such failures are found i
Page 31 and 32:
268 Zagha 4.1.3. The Relationship b
Page 33 and 34:
270 Zagha a final account report of
Page 35 and 36:
272 Zagha 4.1.6. Functions of LGUs
Page 37 and 38:
274 Zagha • Management of LGU ass
Page 39 and 40:
276 Zagha Figure 2: Local Governmen
Page 41 and 42:
278 Zagha In summary, what the data
Page 43 and 44:
280 Zagha on the cash basis. Almost
Page 45 and 46:
282 Zagha Figure 7: Business Opinio
Page 47 and 48:
284 Zagha within the Palestinian na
Page 49 and 50:
286 Zagha Table 5: Number of NGOs i
Page 51 and 52:
288 Zagha Fiscal decentralisation i
Page 53 and 54:
290 Zagha Burki, J., Perry, G., Dil
Page 55 and 56:
292 Zagha Palestinian Legislative C
Page 58 and 59:
Issues, Performance and Trajectorie
Page 60 and 61:
Proceedings “The Palestinian Econ
Page 62 and 63:
Page 64 and 65:
Page 66 and 67:
Page 68 and 69:
Page 70 and 71:
Page 72 and 73:
Page 74 and 75:
Page 76 and 77:
The Effect of the Israeli-Palestini
Page 78 and 79:
Page 80 and 81:
Page 82 and 83:
Page 84 and 85:
Page 86 and 87:
Page 88 and 89:
Page 90 and 91:
Page 92 and 93: Proceedings “The Palestinian Econ
Page 104 and 105: Assessing the Causes of Inequality
Page 158 and 159: Labour Force Instability and Employ
Page 184: Proceedings “The Palestinian Econ
Page 187 and 188: 424 Olivera provisions - in particu
Page 189 and 190: 426 Olivera Figure 1: Economic Grow
Page 191 and 192: 428 Olivera 3. Traditional economic
Page 193 and 194:
430 Olivera costs and lower market
show all

The Palestinian Economy. Theoretical and Practical Challenges

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?