The Palestinian Economy. Theoretical and Practical Challenges

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Proceedings “The Palestinian Economy: Theoretical and Practical Challenges” 323 4. Data This paper uses individual level data from the quarterly Labour Force Survey carried out by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). The survey collects quarterly data on employment and socio-economic characteristics of individual household members aged 15 years or more. Each round of the survey consists of a nationally representative sample of 7,600 households in Palestinian Territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip). We merged this dataset with separate quarterly data on 10-14 years old children, also provided by the PCBS. The present analysis is based on children between 10 and 14 years old for whom full information on schooling, work and a number of parents’ characteristics is available. 6 We consider only male children for our analysis since observations for female working children are very few. A child is considered working if he worked and was remunerated for at least one hour during the reference week of the survey or was working as an unpaid family member. We restrict the analysis to West Bank since the data on child labour in the Gaza Strip do not seem to be reliable. 7 We consider the period between the beginning of the Second Intifada (September 2000) and 2006, which is the last year for which the survey is available. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for our sample. The first Column presents the characteristics of the total sample. The second and third columns present the distribution of child, parental and household characteristics for working children and non-working children respectively. The fourth and fifth Column describe the characteristics for school participants and school non-participants. Our analysis is based on a sample of 41,789 observations. The percentage of working children is 3.6% and the school participation rate is 97.6%. The sample consists of 62% in the 10-12 years group and 38% in the 13-14 years group. The percentage of working children is higher in the older group while school participation is higher in the younger one. We observe a considerable variation in terms of parental characteristics. Father’s education is the highest for children attending school. Interestingly, unemployed 6 The Palestinian Labour Law, effective since mid-2000, prohibits the employment of children before they reach the age of 15. The Chapter on Juvenile Labour in the Palestinian Labour Law defines boys between 15- 18 years as working juveniles and accordingly allows them to work but prohibits their employment in industries hazardous to their safety or health, in night work, or on official holidays (Birzeit University Development Studies Programme and UNICEF 2004). 7 The figures on child labour in Gaza Strip in our dataset are quite different from the ones in the 2004 Child Labour Survey conducted by the PCBS in 2004. Results from the analysis of child labour and schooling decision for Palestinian children in the Gaza Strip are available upon request from the Authors.
324 Di Maio – Nandi father is more prevalent for children attending school than for working children. Mother’s education is lower for working children than for school participants. On the contrary, the percentage of children with employed mother is notably higher among the working children as compared to children attending school. As for household characteristics, it is interesting to note that the number of male adult unemployed is lower for working children than for school participants. The last group of descriptives gives the district and year level break down of the sample. Three districts – Hebron, Ramallah and Nablus – represent around half of the sample. The schooling in Ramallah appears more than the sample proportion and child labour in Nablus and Hebron appears less than the sample proportion. The last block of numbers shows the composition of the sample in terms of year of survey. It shows that considerable variation exists in the pool in terms of the year of survey and children’s status. Table 3 presents the distribution of the four states that are observable for a child, namely both work and school, only work, only school, and neither. The first row shows that 3% children are engaged in both work and school in West Bank. Less than 1% is involved in only working and 1.7% in neither work nor school. A difference between the 10-12 years and 13-14 years groups is that the percentage of studying only is higher among the younger group. The last block of the table shows the yearly pattern of these four states for children. Looking at the studying only column, we note that schooling has increased until 2002 to then decrease. While working only has remained almost constant over the period, child labour (the sum of child working only and working and studying) followed a U-shaped path over the years with an intermediate peak in 2003, and then reaching the 8.3% in 2006. The percentage of children attending school has gradually increased over time, from 96.4% in 2000 to 97.8% in 2006 but the percentage of studying only is lower at the end of the period than it was before the Second Intifada began. While the percentage of child labour in WB is not large, the high variation across years suggests that some interesting mechanisms may be at work. In the following we offer an explanation of these patterns based on the effects of changes in the number of closure days imposed by Israel.
Page 1 and 2:
The Palestinian Economy Theoretical
Page 3 and 4:
© Gianni Vaggi - Marco Missaglia -
Page 6:
VOLUME II
Page 9 and 10:
246 Zagha 1. Introduction The local
Page 11 and 12:
248 Zagha and groups in political d
Page 13 and 14:
250 Zagha drawbacks in the politica
Page 15 and 16:
252 Zagha it is not surprising that
Page 17 and 18:
254 Zagha economy (including expend
Page 19 and 20:
256 Zagha social norms sharply dist
Page 21 and 22:
258 Zagha Bird (1995) puts it, info
Page 23 and 24:
260 Zagha intergovernmental fiscal
Page 25 and 26:
262 Zagha low rate flat tax levied
Page 27 and 28:
264 Zagha need to be given access t
Page 29 and 30:
266 Zagha Such failures are found i
Page 31 and 32:
268 Zagha 4.1.3. The Relationship b
Page 33 and 34:
270 Zagha a final account report of
Page 35 and 36: 272 Zagha 4.1.6. Functions of LGUs
Page 37 and 38: 274 Zagha • Management of LGU ass
Page 39 and 40: 276 Zagha Figure 2: Local Governmen
Page 41 and 42: 278 Zagha In summary, what the data
Page 43 and 44: 280 Zagha on the cash basis. Almost
Page 45 and 46: 282 Zagha Figure 7: Business Opinio
Page 47 and 48: 284 Zagha within the Palestinian na
Page 49 and 50: 286 Zagha Table 5: Number of NGOs i
Page 51 and 52: 288 Zagha Fiscal decentralisation i
Page 53 and 54: 290 Zagha Burki, J., Perry, G., Dil
Page 55 and 56: 292 Zagha Palestinian Legislative C
Page 58 and 59: Issues, Performance and Trajectorie
Page 60 and 61: Proceedings “The Palestinian Econ
Page 76 and 77: The Effect of the Israeli-Palestini
Page 104 and 105: Assessing the Causes of Inequality
Page 136 and 137:
Proceedings “The Palestinian Econ
Page 138 and 139:
Page 140 and 141:
Page 142 and 143:
Page 144 and 145:
Page 146 and 147:
Page 148 and 149:
Page 150 and 151:
Page 152 and 153:
Page 154 and 155:
Page 156 and 157:
Page 158 and 159:
Labour Force Instability and Employ
Page 160 and 161:
Page 162 and 163:
Page 164 and 165:
Page 166 and 167:
Page 168 and 169:
Page 170 and 171:
Page 172 and 173:
Page 174 and 175:
Page 176 and 177:
Page 178 and 179:
Page 180 and 181:
Page 182 and 183:
Page 184:
Page 187 and 188:
424 Olivera provisions - in particu
Page 189 and 190:
426 Olivera Figure 1: Economic Grow
Page 191 and 192:
428 Olivera 3. Traditional economic
Page 193 and 194:
430 Olivera costs and lower market
show all

The Palestinian Economy. Theoretical and Practical Challenges

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?