Enabling Environment for Social Accountability in ... - SASANet

they would be unlikely to do so. CRC staff members stated that the working group’s recommendations
are usually accepted by the oversight committee.
Aspirant broadcasters must receive permission from the relevant local governor (Law on Radio Waves,
Article 10.1.4). In many cases governors have delayed applications for political reasons, sometimes until
significant pressure has compelled them to provide the requisite permission as was attested to by
members of the CRC staff during the dissemination mission. The purpose of requiring the governor’s
approval is unclear.
License fees are the same for all similarly placed broadcasters without regard to either the
management/ownership structure or the content. The fee structure penalizes broadcasters that aim to
provide higher quality (and therefore more costly) content. It also jeopardizes sustainability for
community broadcasters that are operated by NGOs on a nonprofit basis.
The number of licenses awarded in a given sector is determined by the frequency capacity and interest,
rather than public interest considerations or market-carrying capacity. As noted above, nine terrestrial TV
licenses have now been issued for UB. The disparity between demand and supply results in a serious
incapacity on the part of the market to support these broadcasters (Finding MEDIA 1).
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCING OF NEW PUBLIC BROADCASTING
The 1998 Law on Freedom of the Media formally prohibited state control over the media (Article 4)),
though this was never put into effect. However, a new public service broadcasting law, which came into
effect on July 1, 2005, aims to implement that law. It provides for an independent governing board, the
National Council, for the new public radio and television, which replaced the old national state
broadcaster. 92 The new law provides that the 15 members of the board be nominated by the president (four
members), prime minister (four members), and State Great Khural (seven members), from a list of
nominees proposed by NGOs. Appointments are made by the State Great Khural from these, although this
last step would appear to be more or less a formality. 93
The first National Council was appointed in October 2005, albeit with certain difficulties (Finding
MEDIA 2). The Mongolian Press Institute oversaw the participatory process that led to 34 nominations
by civil society for the National Council. However, only eight of the appointees were drawn from this list;
the other seven were nominated in ways that remain unclear. The chair of the Council, an MPRP member
of parliament until 2004, is viewed by some as too partisan for this position. 94 The Council was divided
over the appointment of the new general director of PRTV. Some members lodged a court case to
challenge the appointment. However, the case was withdrawn and the appointments ratified.
During dissemination of the study in February 2006, some of the director’s critics complained that he was
less qualified than the other candidates, describing him as “untrustworthy” and “totally close to the
MPRP.” During a subsequently televised “open debate” at which members of the National Council were
permitted to pose one question to each of the other three finalist for the position, he was asked to explain
a 6-year-old charge of having embezzled MT 125 million from the national television to produce his own
92 The law originally proposed by the State Great Khural was vetoed by the president on two grounds, namely appointments to
the governing board and advertising. The president’s proposals, described below, were accepted by legislators and are reflected in
the adopted law.
93 The State Great Khural would presumably not review its own nominations.
94 The Public Service Broadcasting Law prohibits the appointment of elected officials and members of political party
management to the National Council, but not former officials or former members of management.
93