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Box 3.4.1 The Community Scorecard: Giving Stakeholders a Platform to Review Project Activity Following the failure of the National Poverty Alleviation Program to significantly reduce poverty, the GoM made poverty reduction one of the highest priorities. A key instrument to this end is the Mongolian Sustainable Livelihoods Project (MSLP) under the Household Livelihoods Capacity Support Council (HLCSC 2004). Stakeholder monitoring of the quality and effectiveness of social services under this program would help GoM to attain its goal “to reduce vulnerability and achieve a secure and sustainable livelihood by targeting poor and vulnerable near-poor households and individuals nationwide.” In particular, the CSC mechanism of the Local Initiatives Fund (LIF) that facilitates community-based performance monitoring has the potential to become a model of social accountability in service delivery, which may be replicated on a larger scale. According to the Project Implementation manual, the process is to be facilitated by the bag governor, khural members, and trained community members, assisted by the soum HLCSC secretary. After the completion of a one-month subproject, the soum HLCSC secretary presides over an open community meeting to assess the subproject and its impact. At the same time, information is elicited from individual community members, and a CSC and Impact Record completed. In a process largely driven by the HLCSC secretariat as opposed to CSOs or user communities, the information from the CSC and Impact Record is combined with that from the community assessment and compiled into a report, which is sent to the aimag HLCSC secretary. The aimag HLCSC retains a record of the information on which the evaluation report is based and then submits a compiled report to HLCSC. The current system of implementation, however, constrains social accountability in several ways. A report by the World Bank’s supervision mission in March-April 2005, notes that the HLCS secretaries regard community score cards and the Impact Record as cumbersome paperwork that they must complete to comply with World Bank requirements. Their attitude indicates a common problem of ownership and sustainability of donorinitiated social accountability mechanisms. The attitude could reduce the usefulness of such tools and must be addressed to promote institutionalization. Fortunately, the Bank’s task team intends to monitor whether community views are aired and heeded, and review how the score cards and other monitoring and evaluation tools are used. This will be done through direct observation by the project’s M&E Officer (MSLP 2005:49). Moreover, when asked about their participation in forums organized by public officials, respondents said they were least likely to participate in a local council on a regular basis (see figure 3.4.3). 50 Figure 3.4.3 Frequency of CSO Participation in GoM Forums (percent) 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Week Month Few Times Once Never Don't Know Ministry/Agency Meeting 5% 21% 37% 6% 30% 2% Legislative Hearing 4% 22% 42% 12% 18% 1% Local Council 4% 16% 32% 7% 38% 2% Meeting Source: CSO Survey (Annex 6, Question KK). 50 Even this low percentage seems a bit high. One CSO leader noted that local councils do not meet monthly, let alone weekly, as some CSOs indicated in their responses, and in any case, far fewer than the 20 percent indicated, participate in local councils on a regular basis. 41
Respondents were equally divided on whether participation in a local council meeting would be effective, somewhat effective, or slightly effective (annex 6, Question LL). The results of the survey are explained partly by the UB-bias of NGOs in Mongolia and the likelihood that national rather than local officials were targeted. Additionally, the centralization of public policy and the budget process have weakened incentives for citizens and CSOs to negotiate with relatively anemic local governmental institutions that are upwardly accountable (Finding 3.4.2). A striking example is weak involvement in school councils or local communities in general (see annex 4, Finding EDU 6). When the Ongi River Movement tried to gain information that would make mining companies and public officials accountable, the lack of downward accountability thwarted its efforts for enforcement of laws on environmental protection (see annex 3, Finding ONGI 6). Many stakeholders blame the Public Sector Management and Finance Law for the lack of downward accountability. The PSMFL has shown positive results in several areas, such as timely budget transfers, control of wage arrears, and overall fiscal discipline. However, the law has also removed most revenue-raising authority from local governments, and limited their role in service delivery. Nor have any compensating arrangements been made for citizen engagement in local budget processes and expenditure tracking (see box 3.4.2). Box 3.4.2 Decentralization: Structural and Practical Impediments to Social Accountability An important constraint on social accountability in Mongolia is the inconsistency between the centralized intergovernmental fiscal transfer system and the relatively decentralized political structures. The centralized fiscal management system has achieved macroeconomic stability, controlled wage arrears, and enabled timely budgetary transfers to local governments (Mongolia’s Regional Development Note 2005). The intergovernmental fiscal mechanism has its legal basis in the General Budget Law, which regulates revenue relations, and the 2002 Public Sector Management and Finance Law, which regulates expenditure responsibilities. The intention of the PSMFL is to increase the accountability and effectiveness of public sector institutions at all levels while respecting the need for fiscal restraint and sustainability. Unfortunately, by centralizing fiscal powers, the law effectively weakened local governments, severely limiting their tax-raising powers and responsibilities for service delivery. Indeed, the current governance system “fragments responsibilities of local governments and control over resources, resulting in weakening of accountability and service delivery for public resources” (Mongolia’s Regional Development Note 2005:2). The PSMFL does not make provision for the participation of soum khurals or ordinary citizens in budget processes. At present their roles are ad hoc and varied in practice (World Bank 2004d). During interviews and focus groups, many stakeholders concurred that the PSMFL had not enhanced downward accountability of public sector institutions, but rather limited the autonomy of local officials and thereby strengthened their upward accountability. These findings are supported by the work of Robin Mearns, Decentralization, Rural Livelihoods and Pasture-Land Management in Post-Socialist Mongolia. Mearns notes that while the PSMFL requires all public agencies to review and submit reports annually to the Ministry of Finance and Economics, there are no provisions holding these agencies accountable to local citizens. Consequently, under the current system, the governors “have little downward accountability to their local constituencies.” The PSMFL also centralized most taxes previously shared with local governments, and local governments have few powers to institute new taxes. Such restrictions in revenue-collection powers may diminish incentives for governors to be downwardly accountable, as well as for citizens, who do not pay taxes to local governments, to demand accountability from local officials. Local governors have limited decision-making powers in each sector. Although aimag budgets reflect spending on education and health, the funds actually flow directly from the central government to respective schools and hospitals. Hence local governments do not have any control over these funds. As one soum governor noted, these “limitations on budget spending on the part of the governor also constrain citizen influence on the budget-allocation process,” as line-item provisions leave little room for local decision making. Indeed, as Mearns argues, in this environment there is little incentive for local populations to use their elected representatives as channels for articulating concerns and making claims (Mearns 2002:138).
Page 2 and 3: Report No. 32584-MN The Enabling En
Page 4 and 5: Table of Contents Acronyms ........
Page 6 and 7: Boxes: Box 2.1.1 Proposed Changes t
Page 8 and 9: Preface This study on “The Enabli
Page 10 and 11: of civic engagement, namely, the ab
Page 12 and 13: Part I. Introduction 1.1 DEFINITION
Page 14 and 15: further and recognizes other types
Page 16 and 17: as resources. 13 The quantitative c
Page 18 and 19: parliamentary elections demonstrate
Page 20 and 21: As figure 2.1.2 clearly illustrates
Page 22 and 23: The Constitution also guarantees th
Page 24 and 25: ise of mass pro-democracy movements
Page 26 and 27: preferences of funders. This has le
Page 28 and 29: Recommendations: 1) The Ministry of
Page 30 and 31: PART III - Assessment of the Enabli
Page 32 and 33: and operations, or demand elections
Page 34 and 35: conferences and workshops, to more
Page 36 and 37: Capacity Building Program,” indep
Page 38 and 39: Efforts to transform the state broa
Page 40 and 41: 2) Given the culture and norms that
Page 42 and 43: Figure 3.3.1 Frequency of CSO Reque
Page 44 and 45: Box 3.3.1 Women for Social Progress
Page 46 and 47: These bureaucratic delays highlight
Page 48 and 49: Other ways for CSOs to generate alt
Page 50 and 51: development initiatives become more
Page 54 and 55: Negotiation also ensures that legis
Page 56 and 57: Although the Environmental Impact A
Page 58 and 59: Part IV—Conclusion This study on
Page 60 and 61: 4.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMME
Page 72 and 73: Currently, the NCAV works in six se
Page 74 and 75: Mongolian Federation of Senior Citi
Page 76 and 77: are reluctant to assume full respon
Page 78 and 79: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: NATIO
Page 80 and 81: WSP-UV’s coordinator remains in c
Page 82 and 83: program officer, the methodology us
Page 84 and 85: critical role in promoting social a
Page 86 and 87: Annex 3: Social Accountability and
Page 88 and 89: khural chairs who served on the ORM
Page 90 and 91: is inadequate. Part of the problem
Page 92 and 93: plans, but there was no follow-up a
Page 94 and 95: Recommendation: Effective CSO colla
Page 96 and 97: wide mandate to manage and monitor
Page 98 and 99: Ulaanbaatar, asking them to identif
Page 100 and 101: Moreover, after a World Bank Superv
Page 102 and 103:
Annex 5. Mongolian Media: Overview
Page 104 and 105:
they would be unlikely to do so. CR
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discussion below), the director of
Page 108 and 109:
Social and cultural considerations
Page 110 and 111:
Findings and Recommendations: Mongo
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Annex 6. Survey of Civil Society Or
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How frequently has your organizatio
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Computer 95% up to 40 computers, 21
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No response 1% BB1. If you have req
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KK. Over the last year, how frequen
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C. What are the most important soci
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L. How much influence do citizens h
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U. Are most civil society organizat
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Annex 8. Stakeholders’ Map CSO NA
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CSO NAME Gandan Monastery Gandantse
Page 132 and 133:
CSO NAME Liberal Women’s Brain Po
Page 134 and 135:
CSO NAME Mongolian Information Netw
Page 136 and 137:
CSO NAME Ongi River Movement (ORM)
Page 138 and 139:
CSO NAME Press Institute Red Cross
Page 140 and 141:
CSO NAME Women For Social Progress,
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AFFILIATION State Great Khural (Par
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AFFILIATION Mineral Resource and Pe
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AFFILIATION National Legal Center (
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AFFILIATION Mongolian Radio and TV
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AFFILIATION UNDP UNICEF CONTACT ANN
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AFFILIATION Mercy Corps CONTACT ANN
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Bibliography Ackerman, John M. 2004
Page 156 and 157:
Finch, Christopher. 2002. “Mongol
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---. 2004. Rural Government Procure
Page 160 and 161:
National University of Mongolia. 20
Page 162 and 163:
UNDP. 2001. A Strategy for Poverty
Page 164:
Zorig Foundation. 2004. “Monitori
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