East Kalimantan Environmentally Sustainable Development Strategy
East Kalimantan Environmentally Sustainable Development Strategy
East Kalimantan Environmentally Sustainable Development Strategy
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69<br />
Unlike timber or oil palm plantations, only a portion of a mining concession is deforested.<br />
Initial mining concessions start with exploration or feasibility study permits. For large<br />
miners, these concessions typically shrink by 60 to 75 percent as they move to production<br />
concessions; this is the result of exploration identifying the actual areas with commercially<br />
recoverable coal. In addition, a land rent is charged based on the size of the production<br />
concession, which encourages companies to seek the minimum size required. The average<br />
production concession for a large miner is 28,000 ha; of this, typically 20 percent of the area is<br />
disturbed, meaning that the earth is dug up and all vegetation on the surface is destroyed. The<br />
average size of a production concession for small miners is just 1,000 ha. Typically 75 percent of<br />
this small area is disturbed. (See Box 5 for more about being a KP miner.) The small companies<br />
have a higher deforestation rate for two reasons. First, they have far smaller areas than big<br />
companies; therefore the proportion of forested land they clear is bigger. Second, the small<br />
companies have less sophisticated exploration equipment; therefore they are less targeted and<br />
systematic in clearing the forests. The amount of deforestation depends on the whether the<br />
disturbed land originally contained forests or already degraded lands.<br />
Story of a KP Miner<br />
Small miners face many challenges across the value chain in doing coal business in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Kalimantan</strong>.<br />
The challenges begin when the small miners apply for mining permits. Lack of transparency and<br />
lengthy bureaucracy of the application process create situations that are conducive for covert<br />
“transactions”. Many small miners complained about the “transactions” which are, in many cases,<br />
costly, uncertain, and risky.<br />
Once the mining permit is obtained, the next challenge is securing land access. The small miners<br />
need to compensate the local communities who live on top of the mining deposit or convince the HPH<br />
companies who hold logging licenses for the area to allow them to access the land. The small miners<br />
also need to tackle the so-called land mafias and land speculators by themselves.<br />
The challenges do not end after land access has been secured. During the mining operation, the<br />
small miners must still manage the local mafias. These local mafias sometimes disguise themselves<br />
as legitimate stakeholders: members of local communities that are disturbed by mining operation,<br />
NGOs which fight for the local communities, or even as government officials that come to collect<br />
some kind mining retribution (lack of clear regulation allows this to happen). Furthermore, theft is<br />
common during the transportation of coal from the site to the port (small miners do not build their<br />
own ports or roads, but utilize the publicly available roads and ports). At certain locations, thieves<br />
come and hop on to the coal truck or coal barge, take whatever they can, and then hop off.<br />
DRAFT<br />
Lack of infrastructure also causes problems for the small miners. When their coal arrives at a port,<br />
the small miners must wait for their turn to ship their coal. Many times at certain ports, when the<br />
water level is too low and no barge can come in, the waiting time can be very long.<br />
All of the above challenges – combined with their small area under license and lack of equipment and<br />
knowhow – lead to low margins for the small miners. To survive, the small miners then try to find<br />
ways to cut costs, which often results in skimping on proper land reclamation and rehabilitation.<br />
Box 5<br />
Going forward, the deforestation rate will likely increase as new production concessions<br />
are increasingly likely to be awarded to small companies. In 2008, of the 1 million ha of licensed<br />
production concessions, around 192,000 ha have been deforested. Although small companies<br />
hold only 28 percent of the total area of production concessions, they account for 61 percent of the<br />
deforestation area. There are currently an additional 3 million ha worth of coal exploration licenses<br />
in <strong>East</strong> <strong>Kalimantan</strong>; given historical patterns, these would translate into an additional 1 million ha of<br />
production concessions by 2030, of which around 564,000 ha would be deforested. This implies an<br />
average deforestation rate of 56 percent of the total production area. The higher deforestation rate