Indigenous Peoples and Conservation Organizations

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The Ju/’hoan in Namibia 119 Figure 7.2 Evolution of Decision-making Structures in Nyae Nyae Ju/Wa Farmer’s Union 1986–1990 Nyae Nyae Farmer’s Cooperative 1990–1995 Nyae Nyae Farmer’s Cooperative 1995– Union NNFC Management Committee Management Board Management Committee Community Representative Council District Meetings Community Rangers Community N!oresi Village Meetings Annual General Meeting A facilitative organization. Individuals chosen as communication links between community (decision makers) and outsiders. All sectors of population participate to reach a high level of consensus. Effective with low population. External model of representation imposed in 1990. By early 1995, Management Committee becomes isolated, speaks on behalf of community, makes decisions for them, and rarely reports back. District representatives form a Management Board decision-making body. Management Committee makes only day-to-day implementation decisions. While population and other factors preclude return to facilitative structure, communication and consensus building is facilitated by work of community rangers and by village and district level meetings. Decision Making Information Flow Adapted from Wyckoff-Baird 1996 ence, stating that “any Namibian has the right to move anywhere in Namibia, but must gain permission from the traditional authority in the area.” Given the lack of easily identifiable hierarchical decision-making structures among the Ju/’hoan, it is difficult to implement even this provision and most outsiders ignore it. The lack of effective political representation hampers the Ju/’hoan’s ability to win redress from the state. Sometimes the challenge to tenure is considerable. Since independence, more than 5,000 Hereros, descendants of those who fled German colonial authority in the early 1900s, have been repatriated, with 40,000 head of cattle, from Botswana to Namibia just south of Nyae Nyae. The grasslands there are inferior, especially compared to those of the Ju/’hoan, who have much smaller herds. Ignoring the fence separating the two areas, the Herero began moving their cattle north in 1995. The resulting damage to wildlife was significant (Stuart-Hill and Perkins 1997), and the Ju/’hoan at first seemed powerless to protect their livelihoods. It is not surprising, then, that the Ju/’hoan were willing to listen to MET staff who came to Nyae Nyae at about that time touting a new policy that promised local people rights to wildlife. In Namibia the state owns all protected and endangered wildlife, but a private landowner owns the huntable game and can petition MET for a harvest quota for protected and endangered species living on the property. This quota is generally the number of animals that can be removed without negatively affecting species sustainability. In 1995 the government enacted a policy for Wildlife Management, Utilization, and Tourism in Communal Areas to promote communitybased natural resource management, which was codified the following year in the 1996 Amendment to the Nature Conservation Act. This act extends some private landowner rights to communal landowners by setting up procedures to establish conservancies. When government certifies that conditions have been met, a conservancy is established that gives the community conditional and limited rights to wildlife on communal land. The use of harvest quotas lets the
120 The Ju/’hoan in Namibia local resource manager see clear linkages between costs and benefits: As farmers manage resources more intensively to increase population numbers, they receive the benefit of higher quotas. These quotas generally translate into financial returns through live sale, tourism, and trophy hunting. It is assumed that these benefits will be incentives to use natural resources sustainably, thereby helping to improve conservation of biodiversity and habitats outside of protected areas like the Khaudum Game Reserve. Although Namibia now has strong legislation for community wildlife management, it does not directly address the greatest threat to the Ju/’hoan, the lack of secure tenure over their land and other resources. In the case of the challenge posed by the Herero cattle herds, the partnership between the NNFC and MET to establish a conservancy may have influenced the government’s decision in June 1997 to order the Herero to leave Nyae Nyae. However the growing pressure being brought to bear by Bushmen both inside and outside the country for tenure rights may also have played a role. 2 At any rate, by the end of 1997 all but one Herero family had complied. III. The Evolution of Communitybased Natural Resource Management in Nyae Nyae The story of how a partnership formed to bring effective community-based natural resource management to Nyae Nyae is complicated. It extends over nearly a decade and involves an extensive cast of actors (see figure 7.3). The story proceeds in three phases: impasse and the search for new approaches; revamping community institutions to take ownership of the project; and negotiating with outsiders to create a conservancy. Because there are so many diverse threads to this story, these phases contain areas of overlap. Like snapshots taken at three intervals, they show the growth and capacity of community organization among the Ju/’hoan as they struggle to become effective stakeholders in managing the land they live on. 3.1 Institutional Gridlock and a New LIFE (1990–1995) To a great extent, what is happening in Namibia today would not have been possible without fundamental policy changes at the national level. MET did not begin with a blank slate. It inherited field staff, policies, and a history of conflict with communities from its colonial predecessor, the Department of Nature Conservation (DNC). Charged with managing wildlife throughout the country, the DNC concentrated on a system of parks and game reserves and limited its rural outreach activities to law enforcement, the control of problem animals (predators killing livestock and elephants destroying crops), and ad hoc environmental awareness-building. In Nyae Nyae, most of the effort went into building up the infrastructure of the Khaudum Game Reserve and restricting its use by local people. Water points were constructed to encourage game to enter the reserve, and DNC staff patrolled to control poaching by local people. They had the authority to enter people’s homes to apprehend suspects and to build campsites on community land for use by government staff. Many such activities were carried out without consulting local residents or n!ore leaders. Following independence, the DNC was replaced by MET. The pace of change since 1990 has been rapid, as the new ministry has increasingly focused on the development of ideas and practices that link conservation with development to improve the quality of life for all Namibians. In 1991, MET began reaching out to local NGOs to conduct socio-ecological surveys of local views about resource management to identify problems and solutions. The survey in Nyae Nyae was the beginning of a different kind of relationship between the agency and the community. While it did not result in joint planning and implementation of wildlife management, it legitimized faceto-face contacts and began a dialogue that might one day make those outcomes possible. At the time, of course, one could not tell what direction was being followed. Certainly MET delivered confusing and contradictory messages to the people of Nyae Nyae. Those messages reflected deep conflicts within the ministry between those who thought nature had to be protected from local people and those who wanted to find a new way. One day representatives from MET would arrive bringing promises of local control over and benefit from the community’s wildlife, while the next day another set of staff would install pumps at water points for game
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Indigenous Peoples and Conservation
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iv Acknowledgments The editors woul
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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION
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4 Conservation and Indigenous Peopl
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CHAPTER 3 Indigenous Federations an
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The Runa in Ecuador 23 Loreto Chont
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The Runa in Ecuador 25 Lower elevat
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The Runa in Ecuador 27 Figure 3.1 I
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The Runa in Ecuador 29 game animals
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The Runa in Ecuador 31 Table 3.2 Pr
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The Runa in Ecuador 33 Pacto Sumaco
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The Runa in Ecuador 35 DINAF and it
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The Runa in Ecuador 37 agement cost
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The Runa in Ecuador 39 Ultimately t
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The Runa in Ecuador 41 small or lar
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The Runa in Ecuador 43 However, it
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The Runa in Ecuador 45 References B
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CHAPTER 4 Lessons in Collaboration:
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Page 154 and 155: Contributors JOHN BUTLER holds a Ph
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