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76 How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida End of Repression ONUSAL’s military division successfully oversaw and verified the dissolution of the FMLN’s military structure, destruction of its weapons and equipment, and its transition from a combatant force to a political party. ONUSAL encountered several problems along the way. It verified that the FMLN had destroyed or handed over all weapons in December 1992, when it formally announced the end of armed conflict. 36 But the accidental explosion of an undisclosed arms cache in May 1993 and the discovery of large quantities of weapons indicated that the FMLN had not handed in all its weapons. 37 Over the succeeding months, the FMLN informed ONUSAL of another 114 arms caches in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras. These contained ammunition, rockets, grenades, and surface-to-air missiles. In total, the FMLN destroyed 10,230 weapons, 140 rockets, 9,228 grenades, 5,107 kilograms of explosives, 74 surface-to-air missiles, and more than 4 million rounds of ammunition. 38 Efforts to reform the armed forces were also largely successful, though there were notable challenges. Under ONUSAL supervision, the government demobilized the civil-defense patrols and reduced the size of the army from 40,000 to 28,000 soldiers. U.S. military advisers trained and assisted with restructuring. They helped develop a new training and doctrine command and provided technical advice on the reorganization of El Salvador’s military college. 39 Instead of abolishing the national guard and treasury police, as stipulated in the Chapultepec agreement, the government incorporated those organizations structurally intact into the army and renamed them the National Border Guard and Military Police, respectively. They retained largely the same missions. 36 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (Onusal),” New York: United Nations, S/25006, December 23, 1992, pp. 282–285. 37 Boutros-Ghali (1992; 1995, p. 2). 38 Wrobel and Gaspar de Oliverra (1997, pp. 137–138). 39 McCormick (1997, p. 297).
Politics and the FMLN in El Salvador 77 Land Reform ONUSAL was partially successful in reintegrating former combatants into Salvadoran society. The Chapultepec agreement provided for the transfer of land to former FMLN combatants, members of the armed forces, and squatters who had occupied land in the conflict areas during the war. 40 A maximum of 7,500 former FMLN combatants, 15,000 former military soldiers, and 25,000 landholders in the zone of conflict were to be reintegrated. 41 They were given credit to purchase land, agricultural training, basic household goods, agricultural tools, housing, and technical assistance. The available land would come from territory that landowners abandoned or were forced off of during the civil war. The National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (Comisión Nacional para la Consolidación de la Paz, or COPAZ) was responsible for administering the land-transfer program. But the agreement’s vagueness on several issues created numerous problems. It said nothing, for example, about the size of the plots to which the beneficiaries were entitled, the amount of government credit available to beneficiaries, and the practical arrangements under which the land was to be transferred. 42 COPAZ was also ineffective at mediating land disputes. By the end of 1994, land titles had been issued to only 40 percent of potential beneficiaries. Setbacks continued over the subsequent several years for a number of reasons: coordination problems among Salvadoran government agencies, payment delays, legal problems, and some owners’ refusal to sell their land. 43 40 UN/DPI (1995a, pp. 206–209). 41 UN/DPI (1995a, p. 29). 42 Timothy A. Wilkins, “The El Salvador Peace Accords: Using International and Domestic Law Norms to Build Peace,” in Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr, eds., Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 275–277. 43 Del Castillo (1997, pp. 342–365).
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THE ARTS CHILD POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE
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HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END Lessons fo
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About the Authors Seth G. Jones is
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Preface By analyzing 648 groups tha
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viii How Terrorist Groups End: Less
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Tables 5.1. Insurgent Groups and In
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xiv How Terrorist Groups End: Lesso
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xvi How Terrorist Groups End: Lesso
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Acknowledgments This book would not
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xxii How Terrorist Groups End: Less
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CHAPTER ONE Introduction There has
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Introduction 3 At the core of these
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Introduction 5 The first step was t
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Introduction 7 attention, processin
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CHAPTER TWO How Terrorist Groups En
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How Terrorist Groups End 11 Some ar
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How Terrorist Groups End 13 helping
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How Terrorist Groups End 15 ficient
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How Terrorist Groups End 17 nomic n
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How Terrorist Groups End 19 or kill
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How Terrorist Groups End 21 terrori
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How Terrorist Groups End 23 ended i
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APPENDIX A End-of-Terror Data Set T
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Table A.1—Continued Organization
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APPENDIX B Al Qa’ida Attacks, 199
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Al Qa’ida Attacks, 1994-2007 189
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APPENDIX C Regression Analysis Usin
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Regression Analysis 199 Table C.1 P
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References 9/11 Commission—see Na
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References 203 ———, “Report
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References 205 ———, “How al
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References 207 Gompert, David C., J
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References 209 Interview with membe
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References 211 Kosal, Margaret, “
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References 213 ———, Continued
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References 215 Parachini, John, “
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References 217 Rubin, Trudy, “New
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References 219 United Nations Depar
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References 221 West, Bing, and Owen
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