How Terrorist Groups End - RAND Corporation

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16 How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida ones, because they often enjoy broader support among a population they seek to represent. 22 Some have also argued that religious groups have long durations because of the staying power of sacred or spiritually based motivations. 23 Similar research suggests that left-wing and right-wing groups have the shortest durations. The logic is that they frequently have trouble identifying concrete goals and retaining popular support. As Audrey Kurth Cronin noted, The left-wing groups of the 1970s, for example, were notorious for their inability to articulate a clear vision of their goals that could be handed down to successors after the first generation of radical leaders departed or were eliminated. 24 Martha Crenshaw argued that right-wing groups have trouble retaining popular support, partly because they often have such decentralized organizational structures that generational transition becomes extremely challenging. 25 Economic conditions may also affect terrorist groups. Poor economic conditions may heighten grievances, which provide a more supportive environment for terrorist groups and increase their longevity. Grievances are difficult to measure independently of terrorism, but measures of average levels of discrimination are feasible. Some argue that greater economic inequality creates broad grievances that favor terrorism. 26 “Governments that fail to meet the basic welfare and eco- 22 USIP (1999, p. 1). 23 David C. Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 3, September 1984, pp. 658–677; Cronin (2006, p. 13). On the link between economic conditions and terrorism, also see Michael Mousseau, “Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3, Winter 2002–2003, pp. 5–29. 24 Cronin (2006, p. 23). 25 USIP (1999, p. 78); Cronin (2002–2003, pp. 39–42). 26 On civil conflict, see Edward N. Muller, “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 50, No. 1, February 1985, pp. 47–61.
How Terrorist Groups End 17 nomic needs of their peoples and suppress their liberties,” wrote Samuel Huntington, “generate violent opposition to themselves and to Western governments that support them.” 27 This means that terrorist groups tend to last longer in poor countries. If so, one way to end terrorism is to improve the economic condition of countries where terrorism is most prevalent. 28 Regime type may also be correlated with the duration of terrorist groups. For instance, some argue that democracy is associated with less discrimination and repression along cultural or other lines, since it endows citizens with a political power (the vote) that they do not enjoy in dictatorships. Even more directly, how well states observe civil rights—such as freedom of association, expression, and due process— should be associated with lower grievances. 29 Others have argued the reverse: Democratic systems place significant constraints on state behavior. As one study concluded, Democracies may be more constrained in their ability to retaliate than authoritarian regimes. . . . Capable authoritarian regimes are able to gather more information on their populations than democracies and can more easily round up terrorists and target those sympathetic to them. 30 The size of terrorist groups may also affect duration. Larger groups may be able to last longer than smaller groups. Other things being equal, they should have more resources, which allows them to sustain activities longer than smaller groups. In addition, it may take more time for governments to break up larger groups, since they have more mem- 27 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Age of Muslim Wars,” Newsweek, December 17, 2001, p. 48. 28 Mousseau (2002–2003, pp. 24–26). 29 Lower grievances, however, do not necessarily translate into less likelihood of war or terrorism. See, for example, James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, February 2003, pp. 75–90, pp. 84–85. 30 Kydd and Walter (2006, p. 61); also see Pape (2005, p. 44).
Page 1 and 2: THE ARTS CHILD POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE
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Page 5 and 6: About the Authors Seth G. Jones is
Page 7: Preface By analyzing 648 groups tha
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Page 27 and 28: CHAPTER ONE Introduction There has
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CHAPTER FIVE Military Force and al
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Military Force and al Qa’ida in I
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APPENDIX A End-of-Terror Data Set T
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Table A.1—Continued Organization
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APPENDIX B Al Qa’ida Attacks, 199
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Al Qa’ida Attacks, 1994-2007 189
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APPENDIX C Regression Analysis Usin
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Regression Analysis 199 Table C.1 P
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References 9/11 Commission—see Na
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References 207 Gompert, David C., J
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References 213 ———, Continued
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References 215 Parachini, John, “
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References 217 Rubin, Trudy, “New
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References 219 United Nations Depar
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References 221 West, Bing, and Owen
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