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134 How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida mosity and arguments that underpin it, and indeed the regions of the world from which its struggle emanated. Local groups are more likely to be effective in influencing locals and countering terrorist ideology than is the U.S. military or other international actors. It is critical to understand who holds power, whom the local population trusts, and where locals get their information— and then to target these forums. In some cases, such as in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas, religious leaders and tribal elders wield most of the power. This means providing assistance to credible indigenous groups, such as Muslim clerics or tribal elders, that can effectively counter jihadist propaganda. These groups do not necessarily have to be supportive of the United States, but they do need to oppose insurgents and have credible influence among the population. Much of this funding may have to be indirect and covert to protect their credibility. Assistance could be directed to indigenous media, political parties, student and youth organizations, labor unions, and religious figures and organizations that meet at least two criteria: (1) They have a notable support base in the local population, and (2) they oppose insurgent groups and insurgent ideology. This approach has some parallels with U.S. efforts during the Cold War to balance the Soviet Union by funding existing political, cultural, social, and media organizations in such areas as Central and Eastern Europe. 27 In Afghanistan, for instance, mosques have historically served as a tipping point for major political upheavals. This led to a major effort by Afghan intelligence officials to focus on mosque leaders. As one Afghan intelligence report in 2006 concluded, “There are 107 mosques in the city of Kandahar out of which 11 are preaching anti-government themes. Our approach is to have all the pro-government mosques incorporated with the process and work on the eleven anti-government ones to change their attitude or else stop their propaganda and leave the area.” 28 In addition, in July 2005, the Ulema Council of Afghani- 27 See, for example, Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Peter Sickle, Building Moderate Muslim Networks, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-574-SRF, 2007. 28 Saleh (2006, p. 8).
Ending the “War” on Terrorism 135 stan called on the Taliban to abandon violence and support the Afghan government in the name of Islam. They also called on the religious scholars of neighboring countries—including Pakistan—to help counter the activities and ideology of the Taliban and other insurgent organizations. 29 A number of Afghan Islamic clerics publicly supported the Afghan government and called the jihad un-Islamic. 30 Moreover, the Ulema Council and some Afghan ulama issued fatwas, or religious decrees, that unambiguously oppose suicide bombing. They argued that suicide bombing did not lead to an eternal life in paradise, did not permit martyrs to see the face of Allah, and did not allow martyrs to have the company of 72 maidens in paradise. These efforts were more effective than U.S.-led information operations, such as dropping leaflets. This strategy was accomplished successfully during the Cold War when applied appropriately. During the Cold War, the United States believed that internal security assistance was critical to prevent certain countries from falling under Soviet influence. 31 The Office of Public Safety, which was established in 1962 in USAID, trained more than 1 million foreign police during its 13-year tenure. 32 President John F. Kennedy, for example, believed that Moscow sought to strengthen its international position by pursuing a strategy of subversion, indirect warfare, and agitation designed to install communist regimes in the developing world. In March 1961, President Kennedy told the U.S. Congress that the West was being “nibbled away at the periphery” by a Soviet strategy of “subversion, infiltration, intimidation, indirect or non-overt aggression, internal revolution, diplomatic blackmail, guerilla warfare or a series of limited wars.” 33 He concluded that providing assistance to police and other internal security forces was critical 29 “Religious Scholars Call on Taliban to Abandon Violence,” Pajhwok Afghan News, July 28, 2005. 30 “Taliban Claim Killing of Pro-Government Religious Scholars in Helmand,” Afghan Islamic Press, July 13, 2005. 31 Gaddis (1982); Brands (1993). 32 Call (1998, p. 317); also see Huggins (1998, p. 111). 33 Kennedy (1962).
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THE ARTS CHILD POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE
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HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END Lessons fo
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About the Authors Seth G. Jones is
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Preface By analyzing 648 groups tha
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viii How Terrorist Groups End: Less
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Tables 5.1. Insurgent Groups and In
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Acknowledgments This book would not
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CHAPTER ONE Introduction There has
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Introduction 3 At the core of these
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Introduction 5 The first step was t
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Introduction 7 attention, processin
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CHAPTER TWO How Terrorist Groups En
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How Terrorist Groups End 11 Some ar
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How Terrorist Groups End 17 nomic n
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How Terrorist Groups End 19 or kill
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How Terrorist Groups End 21 terrori
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How Terrorist Groups End 29 ment of
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Table A.1—Continued Organization
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APPENDIX B Al Qa’ida Attacks, 199
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Al Qa’ida Attacks, 1994-2007 189
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APPENDIX C Regression Analysis Usin
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Regression Analysis 199 Table C.1 P
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References 9/11 Commission—see Na
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References 203 ———, “Report
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References 205 ———, “How al
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References 207 Gompert, David C., J
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References 209 Interview with membe
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References 211 Kosal, Margaret, “
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References 213 ———, Continued
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References 215 Parachini, John, “
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References 217 Rubin, Trudy, “New
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References 219 United Nations Depar
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References 221 West, Bing, and Owen
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