How Terrorist Groups End - RAND Corporation

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10 How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida This chapter is divided into four sections. First, it summarizes the core arguments about how groups end. Second, it outlines the research design to test these arguments. Third, it examines the data and provides an overview of the findings. Fourth, it offers a brief conclusion. The End of Terrorist Groups This section begins by outlining the five main arguments about why terrorist groups end. It then outlines a range of other explanatory factors that may affect the end of terrorist groups. How Groups End There are at least five major ways in which terrorist groups end: policing, military force, splintering, politics, or victory. 1 Other tools may also be useful: providing economic aid to countries dealing with terrorism, imposing economic sanctions on states that harbor terrorist groups, dissuading groups by hardening targets, improving intelligence, or engaging in diplomacy. 2 But these are too weak to be used in a leading role. In practice, terrorist groups typically end due to a combination of factors. But with limited resources and attention, policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts. Consequently, in coding how groups end, we assessed the primary ways in which they ended. Many factors may have contributed to the end of a group, but which was the most significant? What carried the most weight in pushing the group over the edge? 1 We did not include a separate category for capturing or killing enemy leaders, what is often referred to as a decapitation strategy. Rather, we subsumed this under other categories. If a police force adopted this strategy, we included it under law enforcement. If military forces adopted it, we included it under military force. On economic aid, sanctions, and other counterterrorist instruments, see Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004; and Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001. 2 Trager and Zagorcheva (2005–2006).
How Terrorist Groups End 11 Some argue that groups break up primarily because police defeat them. 3 Policing involves the use of police and intelligence units to collect information on terrorist groups, penetrate cells, and arrest key members. A law-enforcement approach may also include developing antiterrorism legislation. This can involve criminalizing activities that are necessary for terrorist groups to function, such as raising money or recruiting openly. As one study concluded, “Terrorism is a crime, and therefore the primary mechanism of any liberal democracy in its efforts against it should be its criminal justice system.” 4 Others contend that terrorist groups can be defeated primarily by military force. As MIT political scientist Barry Posen argued, “Offensive action and offensive military capabilities are necessary components of a successful counterterror strategy.” 5 This involves deploying military forces to capture or kill key members of the terrorist group. In some cases, it might include using military force against states that assist terrorist groups, to undermine their support base. It can involve the use of air strikes and standoff weapons against terrorists and those who harbor them, supported by special operations forces on the ground. 6 Even unsuccessful offensive actions that force terrorist units or cells to stay perpetually on the move to avoid destruction may help to reduce their capability. Constant surveillance makes it difficult for them to plan 3 See, for example, Lindsay Clutterbuck, “Law Enforcement,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004, pp. 140–161; Ross and Gurr (1989, pp. 409–409); Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, 2nd ed., Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1986; Michael A. Sheehan, “Diplomacy,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004, pp. 104–105. 4 Clutterbuck (2004, p. 157). 5 Barry Posen, “The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter 2001–2002, p. 39–55, p. 47. 6 Timothy D. Hoyt, “Military Force,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004, pp. 162–185; Cronin (2002–2003, p. 55); Trager and Zagorcheva (2005–2006, pp. 118–120); David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004, pp. 46–73, p. 60.
Page 1 and 2: THE ARTS CHILD POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE
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CHAPTER FIVE Military Force and al
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Military Force and al Qa’ida in I
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APPENDIX A End-of-Terror Data Set T
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Table A.1—Continued Organization
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APPENDIX B Al Qa’ida Attacks, 199
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Al Qa’ida Attacks, 1994-2007 189
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APPENDIX C Regression Analysis Usin
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Regression Analysis 199 Table C.1 P
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References 9/11 Commission—see Na
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References 207 Gompert, David C., J
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How Terrorist Groups End - RAND Corporation

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