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58 How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida to invoke the law against Aum Shinkrikyo. But on January 31, 1997, the Public Security Commission decided that it would not invoke the Anti-Subversive Activities Law, on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence that Aum was capable of carrying out continued or repeated attacks in the future. 45 After that, younger members of Aum Shinrikyo began to revive the group, though not as a terrorist organization. In a January 18, 2000, press conference, an Aum representative admitted that Shōkō Asahara and Aum had been involved in criminal activities and offered apologies to the victims and their surviving family members. Aum also changed its name to Aleph and stated that Asahara was no longer recognized as their leader. Furthermore, they noted that those doctrines legitimizing murder and violence had been eliminated. Fumihiro Joyu, the group’s second-highest official, who served a three-year jail term for perjury, extended his apologies to victims of Aum Shinrikyo’s crimes: “I’d like to give a deep apology to the victims and bereaved, and say that I feel personally responsible as one who belonged to the same religious group.” 46 Nonetheless, Japanese police and intelligence agencies continued to monitor Aleph’s activities. Between 2000 and 2005, for example, the Public Security Intelligence Agency conducted on-site inspections at 185 Aleph facilities in 19 prefectures across Japan. 47 The Logic of Policing A policing strategy was effective in ending Aum Shinrikyo as a terrorist organization. Japan’s police and intelligence services responded 45 Christopher W. Hughes, “The Reaction of the Police and Security Authorities to Aum Shinrikyo,” in Robert Kisala and Mark Mullins, eds., Religion and Social Crisis in Japan: Understanding Japanese Society Through the Aum Affair, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK, and New York: Palgrave, 2001, p. 65. 46 “Aum Admits Matsumoto May Be Linked to Crimes,” Daily Yomiuri, January 19, 2000, p. 1; Calvin Sims, “Poison Gas Group in Japan Distances Itself from Guru,” New York Times, January 19, 2000, p. A6. 47 Public Security Intelligence Agency, The Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations, Tokyo, 2006.
Policing and Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo 59 to the Tokyo subway attack with a massive intelligence-collection and -analysis effort (including information gleaned from detained Aum Shinrikyo members). They developed a picture of Aum’s organizational structure, tactics, strategies, production and use of chemical and biological agents, and involvement in terrorist attacks. They then arrested key members of the group, developed an information campaign to dissuade current and potential members from joining the organization, and tried to cripple the organization through legal measures. While Aum Shinrikyo continued to exist as a cult, changing its name to Aleph, it ceased to be involved in terrorism. While successful against Aum Shinrikyo, policing is less likely to be effective against large insurgent groups that use terrorism. In these cases, military forces may be necessary, since they have greater firepower. What does the Aum Shinrikyo experience suggest about the end of terrorist groups more broadly? There are several issues worth considering. First, Japan was a strong state that had, in Max Weber’s words, a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” 48 This is not always the case. Adopting a policing strategy in weak states presents a significant challenge, though it does not preclude working with tribal groups or other substate actors. Second, Japan was committed to undermining Aum Shinrikyo. Unfortunately, a state may support terrorist groups operating on its soil, as Syria has historically done with Palestinian terrorist groups. Encouraging a policing strategy in these countries—and expecting local forces to undermine terrorist groups—may be wishful thinking. Third, Japan was democratic. Implementing a policing strategy in a nondemocratic state may be notably different because of disparate laws and norms of behavior, including the repressive nature of security forces. Fourth, while Aum Shinrikyo did possess some expertise in biological and chemical warfare and did conduct military training for some of its members, it was not capable of taking on Japanese security forces in pitched battles. 48 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Max Weber, Hans Heinrich Gerth, and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York: Oxford University Press, 1958, pp. 77–128, p. 78.
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THE ARTS CHILD POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE
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HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END Lessons fo
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About the Authors Seth G. Jones is
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Preface By analyzing 648 groups tha
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viii How Terrorist Groups End: Less
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Tables 5.1. Insurgent Groups and In
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Acknowledgments This book would not
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CHAPTER ONE Introduction There has
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Introduction 3 At the core of these
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Introduction 5 The first step was t
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Table A.1—Continued Organization
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APPENDIX B Al Qa’ida Attacks, 199
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Al Qa’ida Attacks, 1994-2007 189
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APPENDIX C Regression Analysis Usin
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Regression Analysis 199 Table C.1 P
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References 9/11 Commission—see Na
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References 203 ———, “Report
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References 205 ———, “How al
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References 207 Gompert, David C., J
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References 209 Interview with membe
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References 211 Kosal, Margaret, “
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References 213 ———, Continued
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References 215 Parachini, John, “
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References 217 Rubin, Trudy, “New
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References 219 United Nations Depar
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References 221 West, Bing, and Owen
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