206 <strong>How</strong> <strong>Terrorist</strong> <strong>Groups</strong> <strong>End</strong>: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida Eisenstadt, Michael, and Jeffrey White, Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency, Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 50, December 2005. Embassy of El Salvador, “The Peace Accords,” undated Web page. As of April 14, 2008: http://www.elsalvador.org/embajadas/eeuu/home.nsf/politics Evans, Jonathan, “Address to the Society of Editors by the Director General of the Security Service, Jonathan Evans,” Society of Editors’ “A Matter of Trust” conference, Radisson Edwardian Hotel, Manchester, UK, November 5, 2007. Fadel, Leila, “Iraq: Old Allegiances Loom Large as U.S. Trains Iraqi Forces,” Miami Herald, June 17, 2007, p. A24. Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, February 2003, pp. 75–90. Feith, Douglas J., War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008. Freedberg, Sydney J. Jr., “The New Iraqi Way of War,” National Journal, Vol. 39, No. 23, June 9, 2007, pp. 36–43. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2007: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, New York: Freedom House, 2007. Fromkin, David, “The Strategy of Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 4, July 1975, pp. 683–698. Gaddis, John Lewis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Galula, David, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, New York: Praeger, 1964. ———, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, St. Petersburg, Fla.: Hailer Publishing, 2005. George, Alexander L., “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, New York: Free Press, 1979, pp. 43–68. George, Alexander L., and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” in Robert F. Coulam and Richard A. Smith, Advances in Information Processing in Organizations: A Research Annual, Vol. 2, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985, pp. 21–58. Gompert, David C., and James Dobbins, “A Far Too Costly Pentagon,” United Press International, February 27, 2006.
References 207 Gompert, David C., John Gordon IV, Adam Grissom, David R. Frelinger, Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, Edward O’Connell, Brooke K. Stearns, and Robert E. Hunter, War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency (<strong>RAND</strong> Counterinsurgency Study: Final Report), Santa Monica, Calif.: <strong>RAND</strong> <strong>Corporation</strong>, MG-595/2-OSD, 2008. As of March 11, 2008: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG595.2/ Gordon, Michael R., “Grim Report Out of Anbar Is Disputed by General,” New York Times, September 13, 2006, p. A15. ———, “G.I.’s Forge Sunni Tie in Bid to Squeeze Militants,” New York Times, July 6, 2007, p. A1. Great Britain Northern Ireland Office, The Belfast Agreement: An Agreement Reached at the Multi-Party Talks on Northern Ireland, London: Stationery Office, 1998. Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, 1986. Guidère, Mathieu, and Peter Harling, “Iraq’s Resistance Evolves,” Le Monde Diplomatique, May 2006. Gunaratna, Rohan, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. ———, “Combating the Al-Qaeda Associated <strong>Groups</strong>,” in Doron Zimmermann and Andreas Wenger, eds., <strong>How</strong> States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics in the West, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007, pp. 175–202. Gurr, Ted Robert, “Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases,” in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1990, pp. 86–102. Harub, Khalid, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000. Hashim, Ahmed, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006. Hastert, Paul L., “Operation Anaconda: Perception Meets Reality in the Hills of Afghanistan,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28, No. 1, January–February 2005. Hatfield, Mark O., James Leach, and George Miller, Bankrolling Failure: United States Policy in El Salvador and the Urgent Need for Reform: A Report to the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, Washington, D.C., 1987. Hazan, D., Sunni Jihad <strong>Groups</strong> Rise Up Against Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Washington, D.C.: Middle East Media Research Institute, Inquiry and Analysis Series 336, March 22, 2007.
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About the Authors Seth G. Jones is
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