210 <strong>How</strong> <strong>Terrorist</strong> <strong>Groups</strong> <strong>End</strong>: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida Jones, Seth G., Olga Oliker, Peter Chalk, C. Christine Fair, Rollie Lal, and James Dobbins, Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes, Santa Monica, Calif.: <strong>RAND</strong> <strong>Corporation</strong>, MG-550-OSI, 2006. As of March 7, 2008: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG550/ Jones, Seth G., Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley, Establishing Law and Order After Conflict, Santa Monica, Calif.: <strong>RAND</strong> <strong>Corporation</strong>, MG-374-RC, 2005. As of March 13, 2008: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG374/ Juergensmeyer, Mark, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2000. Kalyvas, Stathis N., The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Kaplan, David E., and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the <strong>End</strong> of the World: The Terrifying Story of the Aum Doomsday Cult, from the Subways of Tokyo to the Nuclear Arsenals of Russia, New York: Crown Publishers, 1996. Karl, Terry Lynn, “El Salvador at the Crossroads: Negotiations or Total War,” World Policy Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2, April 1989, pp. 321–355. Karzai, Hekmat, Afghanistan and the Globalisation of <strong>Terrorist</strong> Tactics, Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, January 2006. Karzei, Hekmat, and Seth G. Jones, “<strong>How</strong> to Curb Rising Suicide Terrorism in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, July 18, 2006. Katzenstein, Peter J., “Same War: Different Views: Germany, Japan, and Counterterrorism,” International Organization, Vol. 57, No. 4, Autumn 2003, pp. 731–760. Kennedy, John F., “Special Message to the Congress on the Defense Budget,” March 28, 1961, in John F. Kennedy, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy; Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 20 to December 31, 1961, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962, p. 236. ———, “Development of U.S. and Indigenous Police, Paramilitary and Military Resources,” national security action memorandum 162, June 19, 1962. Khalil, Lydia, “The Islamic State of Iraq Launches Plan of Nobility,” Terrorism Focus, Vol. 4, No. 7, March 27, 2007. Klein, Hans-Joachim, La Mort Mercenaire: Témoignage d’un Ancient <strong>Terrorist</strong>e Oust-Allemand, Paris: Seuil, 1980. Klein, Joe, “Saddam’s Revenge,” Time, September 26, 2005, pp. 44–51.
References 211 Kosal, Margaret, “Terrorism Targeting Industrial Chemical Facilities: Strategic Motivations and the Implications for U.S. Security,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 7, October 2006, pp. 719–751. Kosiak, Steven M., The Global War on Terror (GWOT): Costs, Cost Growth and Estimating Funding Requirements, testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Budget, February 6, 2007. Kramer, Mark, “The Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia’s War in Chechnya,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3, Winter 2004–2005, pp. 5–62. Kraul, Chris, “In Ramadi, a Ragtag Solution with Real Results,” Los Angeles Times, May 7, 2007, p. A6. Kull, Steven, Clay Ramsay, Stephen Weber, Evan Lewis, Ebrahim Mohseni, Mary Speck, Melanie Ciolek, and Melinda Brouwer, Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda, College Park, Md.: WorldPublicOpinion. org, Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, 2007. Kydd, Andrew, and Barbara F. Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence,” International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 2, Spring 2002, pp. 263–296. ———, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1, Summer 2006, pp. 49–79. Lake, David A., “Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty- First Century,” Dialogue IO, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 2002, pp. 15–29. Levine, Mark, “Peacemaking in El Salvador,” in Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr, eds., Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 227–255. Lewis, Bernard, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, New York: Modern Library, 2003. Libicki, Martin C., The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1994. ———, Information Technology Standards: Quest for the Common Byte, Boston: Digital Press, 1995a. ———, What Is Information Warfare? Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1995b. ———, Who Runs What in the Global Information Grid: Ways to Share Local and Global Responsibility, Santa Monica, Calif.: <strong>RAND</strong> <strong>Corporation</strong>, MR-1247-AF, 2000. As of March 13, 2008: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1247/
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