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94 How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida changes. First, the new police officers had joined at the urging of their tribal leaders in a society in which tribal relationships were crucial. This bolstered their solidarity and made it more likely they would stand under pressure. Second, enough police officers knew who the individual members of AQI were and were motivated to take action against them. Since AQI drew from the same neighborhoods and demographic pool from which the police came from, this knowledge should not have been difficult to come by. But it was not exploited earlier. The police also brought a great deal of local intelligence with them into the force. 33 One U.S. Army lieutenant, Ed Clark, observed in May that “about 10 percent of our intelligence is actionable, while 90% of their intelligence is actionable.” 34 The defection of other insurgent groups was critical. The defectors had good knowledge of AQI, largely because the insurgency was networked across organizational lines prior to 2006. It was usual for Sunni insurgents not only to interact with one another but to use common sources of expertise, such as the subnetworks that created IEDs. Once the groups started breaking off from AQI, those who defected to the police force could more easily find and identify AQI leaders, thanks to their prior knowledge. In a conflict in which intelligence is paramount, former insurgent members were a crucial force multiplier. 35 The U.S. Role in al Anbar The United States played an important, though supportive, role. Indeed, the working relationship between the U.S. military and the Sunni tribes of al Anbar may well have made the difference between 33 Chris Kraul, “In Ramadi, a Ragtag Solution with Real Results,” Los Angeles Times, May 7, 2007, p. A6. 34 Kraul (2007). 35 The insurgents had, in effect, trained many of the new police officers. Consider the following newspaper story: “Marine Sgt. Tony Storey . . . recalls one man who was a natural with his AK-47. ‘Where’d you learn to shoot like that?’ Storey asked. ‘Insurgent,’ the man said with a smile” (Leila Fadel, “Iraq: Old Allegiances Loom Large as U.S. Trains Iraqi Forces,” Miami Herald, June 17, 2007, p. A24).
Military Force and al Qa’ida in Iraq 95 failure and success, though it took years for the United States to embrace such a relationship. Success at wooing the tribes took a long time, largely because the benefits took a while to be recognized. Initially, some in the U.S. military wanted to support tribes but were told that tribal authority was a relic of Iraq’s past and not part of its democratic future. 36 In late 2005, the U.S. military made a more successful attempt to gain the cooperation of tribes in the far-western part of al Anbar province, which helped pacify the area more than a year before the rest of al Anbar was pacified. 37 The U.S. part of the al Anbar bargain was to provide protection for the sheikhs and their entourages, most visibly by parking a tank outside each sheikh’s compound. 38 The sheikhs, in turn, promised to persuade tribe members to join the police forces of Ramadi and other al Anbar towns. Some reports credited U.S. Army Colonel Sean Mac- Farland for having convinced the al Anbar sheikhs to cooperate. He certainly pushed the project forward, but the U.S. role was more as a catalyst. 39 The sheikhs had reasons of their own to oppose AQI, which had killed many family members and cut into their operations (such as 36 This was reported by Joe Klein, “Saddam’s Revenge,” Time, September 26, 2005, pp. 44–51). Military-intelligence officers presented the CPA with a plan to make a deal with 19 subtribes of the enormous Dulaimi clan, located in al Anbar province, the heart of the Sunni triangle. The tribes “had agreed to disarm and keep us informed of traffic going through their territories,” says a former Army intelligence officer. “All it would have required from the CPA was formal recognition that the tribes existed—and $3 million.” The money would go toward establishing tribal security forces. “It was a foot in the door, but we couldn’t get the CPA to move.” Bremer’s spokesperson, Dan Senor, said that a significant effort was made to reach out to the tribes. But several military officials dispute that. “The standard answer we got from Bremer’s people was that tribes are a vestige of the past, that they have no place in the new democratic Iraq,” says the former intelligence officer. 37 West and West (2007). As reported in late 2005, acceptably trained Iraqi battalions began to join the persistent U.S. forces in al Anbar. AQI resorted to suicide attacks and roadside bombs and avoided direct fights. Subtribes began to kill AQI members in retaliation for individual crimes and discovered that AQI was ruthless but not tough. Near the Syrian border, an entire tribe joined forces with the Marines and drove AQI from the city of al Qaim. 38 Perry (2006). Unfortunately, such help did not prevent the assassination of Sheikh Adbul Saltar in the summer of 2007. 39 See, for instance, Jim Michaels, “Behind Success in Ramadi: An Army Colonel’s Gamble,” USA Today, May 1, 2007a, p. A1.
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THE ARTS CHILD POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE
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HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END Lessons fo
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About the Authors Seth G. Jones is
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Preface By analyzing 648 groups tha
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viii How Terrorist Groups End: Less
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Tables 5.1. Insurgent Groups and In
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Acknowledgments This book would not
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CHAPTER ONE Introduction There has
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Introduction 3 At the core of these
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Introduction 5 The first step was t
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Introduction 7 attention, processin
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CHAPTER TWO How Terrorist Groups En
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How Terrorist Groups End 11 Some ar
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How Terrorist Groups End 13 helping
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Table A.1—Continued Organization
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APPENDIX B Al Qa’ida Attacks, 199
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Al Qa’ida Attacks, 1994-2007 189
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APPENDIX C Regression Analysis Usin
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Regression Analysis 199 Table C.1 P
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References 9/11 Commission—see Na
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References 203 ———, “Report
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References 205 ———, “How al
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References 207 Gompert, David C., J
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References 209 Interview with membe
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References 211 Kosal, Margaret, “
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References 213 ———, Continued
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References 215 Parachini, John, “
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References 217 Rubin, Trudy, “New
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References 219 United Nations Depar
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References 221 West, Bing, and Owen
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