How Terrorist Groups End - RAND Corporation

80 How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida
Figure 4.1
FMLN Goals and Settlement Prospects
Broad
FMLN goals
State’s willingness to reach
a settlement
High
Breadth of terrorist goals
Possibility of settlement
State willingness to settle
Breadth of terrorist goals
Narrow
Status
quo
Policy
change
Territorial
change
Regime
change
Empire
Low
Social
revolution
Group goals
RAND MG741-4.1
more likely nonviolent tactics may be possible. This is particularly true
if there are clear alternatives to terrorism, such as protests. As Martha
Crenshaw noted, “opportunities for collective action, such as mass protest
or revolution, may occur independently of government actions.” Or
“government repression may be a catalyst for the short of mass mobilization
that makes terrorism unnecessary, or a transition to democracy
may permit effective legal opposition.” 45 Unlike the peace-settlement
option, terrorist groups that pursue this path do not necessarily reach
a formal agreement with the government. They calculate that pursuing
their goals through nonviolent, civic means has greater benefits and
lower costs. Indeed, most terrorist organizations are strategic calculators.
They use violence to achieve specific political purposes, such as
coercing a target government to change policy, mobilizing additional
45 Crenshaw (1996, p. 266).