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132 How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida him. After two top al Qa’ida leaders—Ammar al-Baluchi and Tawfiq bin Attash—were captured, Khan became a key al Qa’ida official in Karachi. He was involved in training al Qa’ida operatives in Shakai, Pakistan. During this time, he remained closely associated with such al Qa’ida leaders as Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, Hamza al-Jawfi, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, and Abu Musab al-Baluchi. With help from the CIA, which had been tracking him, Pakistani intelligence arrested him on July 13, 2004. He—and his laptop—were a gold mine of information and gave Pakistan, the United States, and other countries vital information on al Qa’ida operations. The laptop contained the plans of Abu Issa al- Hindi (also known as Dhiren Barot), a senior member of al Qa’ida whom British authorities arrested for plotting attacks in the United States and UK. Under interrogation, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed acknowledged that he had told Khan to carry out reconnaissance of, and prepare a plan to attack, Heathrow Airport. After initial planning, Khan also suggested Canary Wharf and London’s subway system as additional targets. Access to Khan’s computer after his capture showed that their well-advanced plans included attacks on the headquarters of Citigroup and Prudential Insurance Group in New York, the United Nations headquarters in New York, and the International Monetary Fund and World Bank buildings in Washington. 23 Legal and Other Measures The third step is the development and passage of legal measures. This can involve criminalizing activities that are necessary for terrorist groups to function, such as raising money or recruiting members. It can also involve passing laws that make it easier for the intelligence and police services to conduct searches, engage in electronic surveillance, interrogate suspects, and monitor groups that pose a terrorist threat. It can include efforts to protect witnesses, juries, and judges from threats and intimidate. In democratic states, this inevitably leads to tension between civil liberties and security. As one scholar noted, “a democratic nation wants life, liberty, and unity as the products of its policies for dealing with terrorism, not just physical security. Focusing exclu- 23 Musharraf (2006, pp. 241–242).
Ending the “War” on Terrorism 133 sively on a very popular desire for revenge . . . is likely to provide too little liberty and unity to be a sensible policy.” 24 Since terrorist groups need to move money to multiple cells to help sustain their operations, attacking their finances or following financial leads once terrorists are captured has provided effective results. But there are challenges. The financial system known in the Islamic world as hawala exists outside the regulated international financial system. Individuals in Islamic communities around the world serve as go-betweens and facilitate the transfer of cash that is not taxed, recorded, or registered by banks. These informal hawala networks remain largely outside government control, and monitoring them presents a significant challenge to closing terrorist financial exchanges. 25 Countering Ideology Counterterrorism is just as much about hearts and minds as it is about policing and intelligence. It requires taking calculated actions that do not alienate Muslims. And it also requires effectively countering the ideology and messages of terrorist groups through what is often referred to as information operations. This includes the use of a variety of strategies and tools to counter, influence, or disrupt the message and operation of terrorist groups. 26 Local groups are almost always better placed to conduct information operations than the United States is. In addition to building local police and intelligence capacity, dealing with al Qa’ida also requires countering its ideological appeal. This includes countering the continued resonance of its message, its ability to attract recruits and replenish its ranks, and its capacity for continual regeneration and renewal. To do so, the United States needs to better understand the mind-set and minutia of the al Qa’ida movement, the ani- 24 Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998, p. 153. 25 On challenges in countering the hawala system, see Gary Berntsen, First Directive, unpublished manuscript, August 2007. 26 On the use of information operations in a military context, see, for example, USJFCOM (2006).
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THE ARTS CHILD POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE
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HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END Lessons fo
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About the Authors Seth G. Jones is
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Preface By analyzing 648 groups tha
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viii How Terrorist Groups End: Less
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Tables 5.1. Insurgent Groups and In
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xvi How Terrorist Groups End: Lesso
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Acknowledgments This book would not
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CHAPTER ONE Introduction There has
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Introduction 3 At the core of these
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Introduction 5 The first step was t
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Introduction 7 attention, processin
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CHAPTER TWO How Terrorist Groups En
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How Terrorist Groups End 11 Some ar
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How Terrorist Groups End 13 helping
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How Terrorist Groups End 25 Consequ
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How Terrorist Groups End 29 ment of
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Table A.1—Continued Organization
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APPENDIX B Al Qa’ida Attacks, 199
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Al Qa’ida Attacks, 1994-2007 189
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APPENDIX C Regression Analysis Usin
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Regression Analysis 199 Table C.1 P
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References 9/11 Commission—see Na
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References 203 ———, “Report
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References 205 ———, “How al
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References 207 Gompert, David C., J
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References 209 Interview with membe
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References 211 Kosal, Margaret, “
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References 213 ———, Continued
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References 215 Parachini, John, “
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References 217 Rubin, Trudy, “New
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References 219 United Nations Depar
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References 221 West, Bing, and Owen
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