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Caspian Report - Issue 06 - Winter 2014

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SERGII TOLSTOV<br />

100<br />

AFTER TYMOSHENKO WAS SENTENCED TO PRISON IN<br />

2011, SELECTIVE PROSECUTION OF THE OPPOSITION<br />

LEADERS ON POLITICAL GROUNDS WAS THE MAIN<br />

DRIVING FORCE OF THE EU’S APPROACH TO UKRAINE’S<br />

POLITICS THROUGHOUT 2012.<br />

opposition leaders. While criticising<br />

the internal policy actions of official<br />

Kiev (e.g. the legally questionable formation<br />

of the parliamentary majority,<br />

returning the Constitution to its 1996<br />

version), the leaders of a number of<br />

the EU countries, demonstrated solidarity<br />

with Yulia Tymoshenko, who is<br />

regarded as the Ukrainian opposition<br />

leader and the chief representative of<br />

the “pro-European” faction in Ukrainian<br />

politics.<br />

After Tymoshenko was sentenced to<br />

prison in 2011, selective prosecution<br />

of the opposition leaders on political<br />

grounds was the main driving force of<br />

the EU’s approach to Ukraine’s politics<br />

throughout 2012. There were even<br />

attempts at a diplomatic boycott and<br />

calls to disrupt the Euro 2012 Football<br />

Championship.<br />

Regardless of the fact that in 2013, the<br />

Ukrainian authorities demonstrated<br />

their readiness to sign the Association<br />

Agreement, the subject of Tymoshenko’s<br />

release dominated the statements<br />

of the EU official representatives. This<br />

allowed the European politicians to<br />

avoid discussing a number of practical<br />

issues including those related to the<br />

practical preparation of Ukraine’s economic<br />

and political association with<br />

the EU. Thus, the policy of “vertical”<br />

management and dictate in relation to<br />

Ukraine was perceived in Brussels and<br />

the capitals of European countries as<br />

wholly natural and reasonable. There<br />

are also serious grounds to think that<br />

the emphasis on the subjects of releasing<br />

Tymoshenko and conducting<br />

deeper political reforms in Ukraine<br />

was considered by the European politicians<br />

constitute a form of political propaganda.<br />

These tactics allowed them<br />

to avoid discussing the subject of direct<br />

territorial and normative competition<br />

between European and Eurasian integration<br />

projects.<br />

Yanukovich and most members of the<br />

Ukrainian government were considered<br />

by the EU and US as more like<br />

technical figures ensuring the performance<br />

of certain functions (first and<br />

foremost, preparation and signing of<br />

the Association Agreement). This approach<br />

allowed the European politicians<br />

and the US administration to<br />

reckon on conducting the required<br />

political adjustments once the Agreement<br />

with Ukraine was signed and had<br />

entered into force (with the assumption<br />

of the casting of candidates for the<br />

presidency in 2015 elections, support<br />

to those figures who will be more useful<br />

and reliable from the point of ensuring<br />

EU interests and conducting the<br />

relevant policy).<br />

In the course of the current crisis, the<br />

US essentially has an optional role. The<br />

US administration is to obtain guarantees<br />

from the Ukrainian authorities to<br />

refrain from forceful suppression of the<br />

“Opposition Maidan” in downtown Kiev,<br />

aimed at pushing Yanukovich to negotiate<br />

with the opposition and form a new<br />

government.<br />

The basic tasks were:<br />

• removal from power of the persons<br />

comprising president’s closest circle

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