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Caspian Report - Issue 06 - Winter 2014

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GARETH M. WINROW<br />

18<br />

ers seeking to reduce their energy<br />

dependence on Russia, the expected<br />

decline in North Sea gas production,<br />

and the real possibility of long-term<br />

IDENTIFIED AS A “PRIORITY PROJECT” BY BRUSSELS, THE<br />

SGC WOULD TRANSPORT GAS FROM THE CASPIAN BASIN,<br />

CENTRAL ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE EASTERN<br />

MEDITERRANEAN TO EUROPE.<br />

instability in North Africa in the wake<br />

of the Arab revolutions, the SGC could<br />

become an increasingly important<br />

conduit for the supply of gas to the EU<br />

market. In a communication released<br />

in November 2010, the European<br />

Commission stated that the SGC could<br />

carry as much as 45-90 bcm annually<br />

by 2020. 1 Brussels is hoping that the<br />

SGC could become a significant channel<br />

through which hydrocarbons are<br />

transported to satisfy the EU’s growing<br />

gas demand.<br />

It is exceedingly difficult to predict the<br />

future gas needs of EU member states<br />

given the uncertainties concerning<br />

growth in European economies, questions<br />

over the possible impact of the socalled<br />

shale gas revolution, and doubts<br />

over the future of nuclear energy.<br />

.It seems, though, that gas will be an<br />

important “bridging fuel” over at least<br />

the next two decades until renewable<br />

forms of energy becomes more<br />

mainstream. with imports currently<br />

accounting for about 64 percent of the<br />

eu’s gas needs, the european commission<br />

has forecast that imports could<br />

constitute up to 80 percent of europe’s<br />

gas demand by 2030. According to<br />

the International Energy Agency, the<br />

annual gas demand in Europe could<br />

increase from the current 526 bcm to<br />

622 bcm by 2030.<br />

At present, approximately one-third<br />

of the EU’s gas needs are met by imports<br />

from Russia. Mostly indexed to<br />

the price of oil, Russian gas is becoming<br />

more expensive. Disputes between<br />

Moscow and Kyiv over gas pricing resulted<br />

in the interruption of deliveries<br />

of Russian natural gas to Europe at the<br />

start of 20<strong>06</strong> and 2009. Heavily dependent<br />

on Russian gas imports, states in<br />

Central and Eastern Europe remain<br />

concerned that Moscow may in future<br />

threaten to suspend gas deliveries in<br />

order to secure political leverage. Energy<br />

dependence on Russia would be<br />

further increased if Gazprom and its<br />

partners succeed in realizing the South<br />

Stream project, which would bypass<br />

Ukraine and deliver an additional 63<br />

bcm to customers in Europe each year.<br />

However, Brussels and Moscow must<br />

first resolve problems with regard to<br />

provisions of the Third Energy Package<br />

– ie. on the “unbundling” of the<br />

ownership of natural gas production<br />

and transmission lines, third party access<br />

to pipelines, and the setting of tariffs<br />

– before the South Stream project<br />

can be advanced.<br />

Given that gas will remain an important<br />

component of the energy mix<br />

in Europe for the foreseeable future,<br />

the realization of the SGC, could enable<br />

EU member states to import gas<br />

from alternative sources and thereby<br />

help reduce energy dependence on<br />

Russia. However, at least in its initial<br />

envisioned phase, the SGC will not<br />

1<br />

. Energy Infrastructure Priorities for 2020 and beyond – A Blueprint for an Integrated European Energy<br />

Network, European Commission, Brussels, 17 November 2010, COM (2010) 677 Final, p.32.

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