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Caspian Report - Issue 06 - Winter 2014

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GARETH M. WINROW<br />

26<br />

The priority for Turkish officials is to<br />

ensure that Turkey’s energy needs<br />

are first met. Ambitions to become a<br />

major energy transit and a key energy<br />

hub are important but nevertheless<br />

IF TANAP IS EVENTUALLY UPGRADED TO ACCOMMODATE<br />

60 BCM OF GAS, THE SGC WOULD BECOME AN IMPORTANT<br />

CONDUIT FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF ENERGY TO<br />

MARKETS IN THE EU.<br />

secondary objectives. The realization<br />

of TANAP will enable Turkey to<br />

increase gas imports from Azerbaijan.<br />

Although Turkmen gas is unlikely to<br />

reach Turkish markets in the foreseeable<br />

future, Turkey could soon be importing<br />

fairly considerable volumes of<br />

gas from Iraqi Kurdistan. This could<br />

enable Ankara to reduce its dependence<br />

on gas imports from Moscow.<br />

According to the International Energy<br />

Agency, in 2012 Turkey imported 45.3<br />

bcm, 27 bcm of which was supplied<br />

by Gazprom.<br />

In order to become an important<br />

gas transit state Turkey will need to<br />

revise its Natural Gas Market Law to<br />

provide for an effective gas transit regime<br />

in line with the EU’s acquis. The<br />

transit agreement concluded with<br />

Azerbaijan for TANAP was in effect an<br />

ad hoc arrangement. Furthermore, in<br />

order to realize its ambitions of becoming<br />

a major energy hub, Turkish<br />

policy-makers will need to build more<br />

pipelines and expand Turkey’s energy<br />

infrastructure and accelerate work on<br />

developing an energy stock exchange<br />

in Istanbul to allow the open trading<br />

of gas.<br />

The realization of the SGC in its initial<br />

format will go some way towards<br />

meeting Turkey’s objectives with regard<br />

to its energy policy. Azerbaijan,<br />

though, will have the ultimate say over<br />

which gas from what sources will be<br />

transported via TANAP. The transportation<br />

of gas to Europe via Turkey from<br />

non-Azerbaijani sources may only<br />

be possible in the longer term, when<br />

TANAP could be greatly expanded.<br />

Turkey’s backing for the South Stream<br />

project is unlikely to endanger the<br />

prospects for the SGC. After fierce<br />

lobbying from Moscow, on December<br />

28, 2011 Ankara finally agreed to the<br />

construction of the offshore section<br />

of the South Stream network through<br />

Turkey’s exclusive economic zone in<br />

the Black Sea. This will enable South<br />

Stream to bypass Ukraine’s exclusive<br />

economic zone. It is important to note,<br />

however, that this agreement between<br />

Turkey and Russia was only reached<br />

after decisions had been taken to go<br />

ahead with TANAP – ie., after important<br />

progress had been made on realizing<br />

the SGC. The official position<br />

of Turkey is that South Stream and<br />

TANAP are complementary rather<br />

than rival projects, and will both help<br />

to meet Europe’s rising energy needs.<br />

CONCLUSION<br />

The final investment decision for<br />

the expansion of work at Shah Deniz<br />

marked a new phase in plans to realize<br />

the SGC. The details of the SGC in<br />

its initial phase of development to<br />

2019 have been significantly clarified.<br />

It remains to be seen how the SGC can<br />

be further developed, assuming that<br />

Europe’s energy needs require the<br />

further expansion of the corridor. Officials<br />

in Baku will be eager to ensure<br />

that Azerbaijan maintains control

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