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Caspian Report - Issue 06 - Winter 2014

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SERGII TOLSTOV<br />

104<br />

proposed a way of shifting the responsibility<br />

to the external supranational<br />

body.<br />

Yanukovich’s visit to Moscow (17 December<br />

2013) secured the strategic<br />

advantages of the governmental authorities<br />

over both the “Maidan” and<br />

the opposition. Any ultimatums from<br />

the opposition delivered to the president<br />

and the government including<br />

the requirement to hold pre-time<br />

elections approved by the European<br />

parliament resolution dated 12 December<br />

2013 lose their relevance.<br />

Having resolved the financial deficit<br />

problems through the support<br />

of Russia’s leadership, Yanukovich<br />

can potentially resolve the political<br />

problems as well.<br />

In relations with Brussels, official<br />

Kiev is definitely not interested in<br />

maintaining or increasing the tensions.<br />

However, the text of the Association<br />

Agreement (especially as<br />

regards the Free Trade Zone and<br />

appendices about the quotas and<br />

the interim periods) can hardly be<br />

signed in its current form. The same<br />

applies to the negotiations with the<br />

IMF, which Kiev will be able to pay<br />

out its debts.<br />

In the current situation, a real and<br />

practical way of rendering assistance<br />

to the Ukrainian society from<br />

the European politicians could be<br />

finding a new format for relations<br />

that reflect the autonomous status<br />

of Ukraine in the European security<br />

balance and recognition that its economic<br />

ties with the CIS market space<br />

are of vital importance.<br />

CONCLUDING REMARKS<br />

1. The developments in the fall of<br />

2013 convincingly demonstrated<br />

the failures of the Ukrainian government’s<br />

plans to create an asymmetric<br />

free trade regime in several strategic<br />

directions. The main reason for the<br />

failure of this foreign economic strategy<br />

was the absolute disagreement on<br />

the side of the EU and Russia with Kiev’s<br />

intentions and proposals reflecting<br />

the vital importance of intensive<br />

links with both market spaces. This<br />

was accompanied by the sharpening<br />

of territorial competition between<br />

the European and Eurasian integration<br />

projects. According to the EU, the<br />

extension of the European economic<br />

standards to the countries of the<br />

“Eastern partnership” was considered<br />

as a pretext for their gradual accession<br />

to the EU economic space without<br />

applying the program of four basic<br />

market freedoms to its members.<br />

Russia’s leadership refused to build<br />

up relations between the Customs<br />

Union and Ukraine based on “3+1”<br />

formula. In connection with this, the<br />

Russian government has discovered<br />

in Kiev’s plans an attempt to create<br />

within the framework of the CIS Free<br />

Trade Zone a zone of uncontrolled reexport<br />

of goods of European and, evidently,<br />

Asian origin including the engineering<br />

products of group assembly.<br />

2. . Introduction of customs restrictions<br />

on Ukrainian exports to Russia<br />

in August-September 2013 demonstrated<br />

the vulnerability of the Ukrainian<br />

economy and its critical dependence<br />

on its commodity exports on<br />

the Russian market. In this connection<br />

it is worth noting that according

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