Caspian Report - Issue 06 - Winter 2014

ALEX VATANKA
12
government would be well advised
to instead pursue narrow and specific
goals that would yield tangible
result over grandiose but unrealistic
– at least in the short term – and lofty
aspirations.
MEANWHILE, BY SIMULTANEOUSLY IMPROVING
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND AZERBAIJAN,
THE IRANIANS CAN FEEL FAR LESS CONCERNED ABOUT
THE CAUCASUS AS A POTENTIAL ZONE OF INSTABILITY
THAT COULD THREATEN TEHRAN’S OWN INTERESTS.
In other words, the government of
President Rouhani should be selective
in its foreign and regional policy
goals. Thus far he has acted in such
a manner. On the international stage,
Rouhani has already made it clear he
wants to repair American-Iranian
relations. Closer to home, he has
specifically referred to the need to
reach out to Saudi Arabia and find
ways to reduce tensions, particularly
as the two countries are seen as
leaders of the Shia and Sunni camps
respectively in the sectarian battle
that is now raging across so many
parts of the Middle East. If he takes
a fresh look at the challenges that
his country faces, other possibilities
do exist for Iranian foreign policy
adjustments.
THE CASE OF THE SOUTH
CAUCASUS
If a narrow focus and attention to the
best returns on investment guides
Rouhani’s approach, then the South
Caucasus deserves his attention. In
this part of the world, Tehran can
through a realignment of its policies
enhance its political standing, promote
its economic objectives and better
safeguard its security interests.
For too long, Tehran has either meddled
in the South Caucasus (specifically
Azerbaijan) or simply abdicated (to
Russia) its role as a larger neighbour
that could play a constructive role in
helping the region meet its challenges.
In Azerbaijan, a country with close historical
and religious ties to Iran, Tehran
for too long sought to play the role of
the “big brother” with a relentless desire
to superimpose its Shia-centric
Islamist political model over a Shiamajority
country that nonetheless remains
secular in its orientation.
Certainly the Iranian theocratic political
model has little appeal in Azerbaijani
society. Still, as far as Baku is concerned,
the Rouhani administration
has an opportunity to overturn some of
Tehran’s past policy mistakes. That was
the message from the meeting between
President Rouhani and President Ilham
Aliyev of Azerbaijan in Davos. However,
at that meeting Rouhani was also reported
to have spoken about a desire
on the part of Iran to assist Azerbaijan
in its oil and natural gas industries. Expressing
a desire for collaboration in
any field is commendable but Rouhani
and his government can achieve far
more vis-à-vis Azerbaijan if they pursue
the same narrow and focused approach
as they have seemingly begun
toward the United States.
Instead of homing in on oil and gas
cooperation – a field where Baku has
already had numerous successes in
the last 20 years and has established
foreign partnerships – Tehran should
introduce new initiatives where its capacity
to make a difference can make
a difference. One such initiative could
be linked to the frozen conflict over Armenian-occupied
Nagorno-Karabakh,