Caspian Report - Issue 06 - Winter 2014

tic style and aimless policies, as well
as his abhorrent opportunism (such
as when he sought to gain popularity
among the Arab populations by raising
questions about the veracity of
the Holocaust).
The president before Ahmadinejad,
the reformist Mohammad Khatami
(1997-2005), was a very different
proposition. Like Rouhani, Khatami
too promised to turn Iran into a
mainstream international actor and
he too reached out to the United
States. Nonetheless, at the end of the
day, regardless of the fact that Ahmadinejad
and Khatami had very different
styles, both only could do as much
as was sanctioned by the Supreme
Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In
other words, in the Iranian political
system, presidents come and go and
at times major policy differences are
evident but the system’s policy continuity
rests on the fact that the Supreme
Leader’s office is a permanent
feature of the political process. That
office has since June 1989 been occupied
by the same man, Ali Khamenei.
Ayatollah Khamenei jealously guards
his political prerogatives, including
his absolute right to block any policy
that he deems as unsuitable for the
Islamist order (nezam), which has
governed Iran since the revolution
of 1979. In that context Khamenei
has certain so-called “red-lines,” or
policy areas where the supreme
leader is more or less fixed in his
mindset, and where no president can
seek to alter the status quo. Up until
recently, enmity toward the United
States was one of those “red-lines”,
but Khamenei has now seemingly
allowed President Rouhani at least
test the waters and see if a deal can
be stuck with Washington. Another
“red-line” is the ideological hostility
against Israel, but there are no signs
that Ayatollah Khamenei is ready yet
to make any concessions on this front.
The vast majority of all the other foreign
policy issues that Iran faces then
fall outside Ayatollah Khamenei’s socalled
“red lines”, and there Rouhani
has much more leeway.
NONETHELESS, AT THE END OF THE DAY, REGARDLESS
OF THE FACT THAT AHMADINEJAD AND KHATAMI HAD
VERY DIFFERENT STYLES, BOTH ONLY COULD DO AS
MUCH AS WAS SANCTIONED BY THE SUPREME LEADER,
AYATOLLAH ALI KHAMENEI.
How can this leeway be utilized in
practical terms by the Rouhani government
At the regional level, Tehran
can be expected to build on existing
multilateral political-economic
structures. On that front, the Economic
Cooperation Organization (Afghanistan,
Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan,
Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan)
and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization - where Tehran has observer
status but has applied for full
membership – stand out as channels
where Iran likely will seek to inject
some momentum in the hope that it
can promote itself as a geographic
bridge connecting West Asia, Central
Asia, and East Asia.
This is of course a tested formula to
which even President Ahmadinejad
endorsed, to only to find himself
empty handed at the end. Over recent
decades attempts at regional
political-economic integration in
West Asia in particular has proven
enormously difficult. The Rouhani
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CASPIAN REPORT, WINTER 2014