Caspian Report - Issue 06 - Winter 2014
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gion. The second scenario entails an<br />
expansion of Russian naval power<br />
projection capabilities such as large<br />
surface missile destroyers, aircraft<br />
carriers, new submarines, and particularly<br />
amphibious forces may aim<br />
at keeping the flag flying in the long<br />
term in the Mediterranean. But the<br />
only main difference from the Cold<br />
War beyond ideologies is that this<br />
fleet aims at protecting the new Russian<br />
pragmatic economic vital interest<br />
that balancing capability to his allies<br />
and territories in prestige inside<br />
the energy politics. We can argue that<br />
Russia could influence strategic cooperation<br />
with Mediterranean states<br />
from Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and<br />
Lebanon using energy cards. Russia<br />
can afford to lose its prestige among<br />
the Arabs and gain a major political<br />
and economic advantage in Southern<br />
Europe and Eastern Mediterranean. 127<br />
CASPIAN REPORT, WINTER <strong>2014</strong>
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