T RAV

166 TRAVELS IN EUROPE.on this side, thestate must always he preparedto.evacuate andmakean esplanade of her territory, to the Sierra Morena; which thus: wouldbe the line of defence to her capital, Seville, of ~omuch importance toher as a naval power with naval allies; for under such circumstancesshe could not fail ofthe support ofBritain.The eastern extremity of the Sier~aMorena, though ft. country of po.sition, is accessible. It is adapted for infantry and artillery, supportingthe cavalry country in its front, and it links on with the Sierra Nevadain the east, forming a grand outline of defence fromsea to sea. Stillto defend Spain!would require ~alent infinitely beyond the commonclass ; and were these produced in her cause, the difficulties nnder whichthey are to be exerted seem aimost insuperable '1/$.At present, the moraland physical powers of the nation are so completely drained and pal..sied, as to allow no expectation of good result from any exertion of remainingvitals. Feeble as Portugal is by nature, tbat country has al..ways had the better in the actual struggles between thé two powers.This shh'\vs how littleis tobe expected in such a case. And Francedreads Spain agreat deal too mnch, not to be jealously awake to anyeffort macle towards emancipation by her, or for her.Spain, althougha monarchy, is at this moment as unconnected as shewas under the Moorish polygarchy. Her provinces have no moral corn..bination.Theinfiuence of a national government,. could snch beherlot, wouid supervene this; but aH is here mere speculation. Her populationis quite Inadequate to supply a force equal to that wwch Francehad under Louis XIV., and Portugal must ever be a thorn in herside.;-1< Success in warfare is admitted tbe proof of wisdom. To common reftection, bowever, it appearsas if in this procedure succells ought to·depend upon depth of views, extent of coznbinations,elosene~1\ Qf'. caleulation.