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258 Socially Intelligent Agentsmuch more difficult to design software agents and mechanisms for generalmulti lateral negotiation. In general, bilateral negotiation is a special case andthere is no reason to infer anything about negotiations among three or moreparties from results with models of bilateral negotiation.The decision by each agent concerning which other agents to engage innegotiation is far from trivial. In the model, agents were concerned with thetrustworthiness, reliability, helpfulness and similarity of other agents. Agentsdid not appear to learn which, if any, of these characteristics should be givenpriority in selecting negotiating and coalition partners.In general, it would be hard to justify as good science the repeated revisionof abstract simulation models until we found one that produced convergence ina negotiating process and then to assert that such a model describes a sociallyuseful approach to negotiation. Producing such a model is a purely intellectualexercise. To be useful, it must be validated. To be validated, it must be shownto be a good descriptor of actual successful multi lateral negotiations. If such amodel can be validated against a range of negotiating processes, we might thenhave some confidence in the model as a pattern for good negotiating practice.It is hard to see any substantive difference between validating abstract modelsand building models around descriptions of actual negotiations. Both involvethe development of a general understanding by means of the development ofdescriptively accurate simulation models.References[1] Chialvo, D.R. and Bak P. Learning from Mistakes, Neuroscience 90:1137-1148, 1999.