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Developing Agents Who Can Relate to Us 437. ConclusionIf we want to put artificial agents truly into the "human-loop" then they willneed to be able to reciprocate our ability to relate to them, including relating tothem relating to us etc. In order to do this it is likely that the development of theagent’s self-modelling will have to be co-developed with its modelling of thehumans it interacts with. Just as our self-modelling has started to be influencedby our interaction with computers and robots [22], their self-modelling shouldbe rooted in our abilities. One algorithm for this has been suggested whichis backed up by a theory of the development of the human self. Others arepossible. I argue elsewhere that if we carry on attempting a pure design stancewith respect to the agents we create we will not be able to achieve an artificialintelligence (at least not one that would pass the Turing Test) [13]. In additionto this failure will be the lack of an ability to relate to us. Who would wantto put anything, however sophisticated, in charge of any aspect of our life ifit does not have the ability to truly relate to us - this ability is an essentialrequirement for many of the roles one might want agents for.References[1] Aydede. Language of Thought Hypothesis: State of the Art, 1999.http://humanities.uchicago.edu/faculty/aydede/LOTH.SEP.html[2] Aydede, M. and Güzeldere, G. Consciousness, Intentionality, and Intelligence: SomeFoundational Issues for Artificial Intelligence. Journal of Experimental and TheoreticalArtificial Intelligence, forthcoming.[3] Barlow, H. The Social Role of Consciousness - Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness.Psycoloquy 3(19), Consciousness (4), 1992.[4] Bickhard,M.H.andTerveenL.Foundational Issues in Artificial Intelligence and CognitiveScience, Impasse and Solution. New York: Elsevier Scientific, 1995.[5] Bridgeman, B. On the Evolution of Consciousness and Language, Psycoloquy 3(15),Consciousness (1), 1992.[6] Bridgeman, B. The Social Bootstrapping of Human Consciousness - Reply to Barlow onBridgeman on Consciousness, Psycoloquy 3(20), Consciousness (5), 1992.[7] Burns, T. R. and Engdahl, E. The Social Construction of Consciousness Part 2: IndividualSelves, Self-Awareness, and Reflectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2:166-184,1998.[8] Dennett, D. C. The Origin of Selves, Cogito, 3:163-173, 1989.[9] Drescher, G. L. Made-up Minds, a Constructivist Approach to Artificial Intelligence.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.[10] Edmonds, B. Social Embeddedness and Agent Development. Proc. UKMAS’98, Manchester,1998.http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/cpmrep46.html[11] Edmonds, B. Capturing Social Embeddedness: a Constructivist Approach. Adaptive Behavior,7(3/4): 323-347, 1999.