View - ResearchGate

Enabling Open Agent Institutions 265ture projection for buyer agents in FM96.5, the computational counterpart ofthe fish market. If some buyer requests his interagent for leaving the institutionafter making some acquisitions in the auction scene, his interagent willrefuse the request because the agent has pending obligations: the payment ofthe acquired goods, as stated by the institutional normative rules.Auctionnot(commit(x:b,y:bac,pay(?g,?price,?card)))registrybuyersadmissionbuyerssettlementsS'Figure 32.2.Performative structure projection for buying agents.In general, based on external agents’ actions, the facts deriving from theirparticipation in scenes and the institutional normative rules, interagents arecapable of determining which obligations and prohibitions to trigger.Finally, interagents handle transparently to external agents their incorporationinto ongoing scenes, their exit from ongoing scenes, their migration betweenscenes, and the joint creation of new scenes with other agents by meansof their coordinated activity with institutional agents, as fully accounted by thecomputational model detailed in [8].5. ConclusionsOrganisational and social concepts can enormously help reduce the complexityinherent to the deployment of open multi-agent systems. In particular,institutions are tremendously valuable to help solve the many inherent issuesto open multi-agent systems. The conception of open multi-agent systems aselectronic institutions lead us to a general computational model based on twotypes of agents: institutional agents and interagents. Although our computationalmodel proved to be valuable in the development of the computationalcounterpart of the fish market, we claim that such a computational model isgeneral enough to found the development of other agent institutions.