CHAPTER VTHE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE AND AMPHIBIOUSOPERATIONS“For the whole reason-<strong>for</strong>-being of all military intelligence personnel is tofacilitate accomplishment of the mission, and to save lives. When they fail,all the wrong people are hurt.”Stedman Chandler and Robert W. RobbFront-Line Intelligence1. Introduction: <strong>Amphibious</strong><strong>Operations</strong> Intelligence,Surveillance, andReconnaissancea. <strong>Amphibious</strong> operations have beencharacterized as the most complex anddifficult of military operations; however, thebasic nature of intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (ISR) does not changein amphibious operations. The intelligencecycle (planning and direction; collection;processing and exploitation; analysis andproduction; dissemination and integration;and evaluation and feedback) remains thesame. Intelligence is still required to assessbasic infrastructure data, weather andterrain, and threats to friendly <strong>for</strong>ces in thearea of interest (AOI). <strong>Amphibious</strong>operations differ from other militaryoperations due to significant challenges posedby a lack of amphibious <strong>for</strong>ce ISR assets inthe operational area during the planning phase,a heavy initial reliance on national and theatercollection assets, the transition to shore, andthe ability to provide predictive analysis tocompensate <strong>for</strong> relatively longer periods ofuncertainty and, in many cases, total chaos.b. <strong>Amphibious</strong> operations involveextensive planning in all functional areas toensure that ships, aircraft, landing craft, andsupporting fires are synchronized to arrive atspecific points at specific times to takeadvantage of enemy critical vulnerabilities andexpedite combat power build-up andsustainment ashore. This requirescomprehensive intelligence preparation ofthe battlespace (IPB), includingharmonization of intelligence and operationalplanners to ensure that COAs are feasible andthat enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, andCOGs are identified and taken intoconsideration.c. <strong>Amphibious</strong> operations rely onintelligence to support planning, COAselection, and maneuver. <strong>Amphibious</strong> <strong>for</strong>ceintelligence operations are conducted acrossstrategic, operational, and tactical levels ofwar. From National Military Strategyconsiderations down to tactical doctrine,intelligence analysis reveals enemy COGs,strengths, and vulnerabilities. Intelligencealso assesses potential <strong>for</strong> maneuver offeredby the battlespace, to include identifyinglanding <strong>for</strong>ce zones of entry. Intelligencesupport throughout the operation provides asolid foundation <strong>for</strong> effective <strong>for</strong>ce protectionef<strong>for</strong>ts <strong>for</strong> the amphibious <strong>for</strong>ce.2. Required Intelligence,Surveillance, andReconnaissance CapabilitiesThe following intelligence capabilities arerequired to support amphibious operations.a. Broad maneuver space and commandsupport in order to enable intelligence todetermine enemy strengths to be avoided andweaknesses to be exploited.V-1
Chapter Vb. Detailed terrain and hydrographicanalysis to identify suitable zones of entry(e.g., beaches, helicopter landing zones, DZs,etc.).c. In<strong>for</strong>mation systems interoperabilitywith national, theater, and joint <strong>for</strong>ceintelligence organizations, to provideintelligence in time <strong>for</strong> amphibious planningand rehearsals.d. Standoff collection assets capable ofsatisfying ATF and LF requirements fromOTH.e. Intelligence dissemination systemslinking widely dispersed <strong>for</strong>ces afloat andashore.f. Flexible intelligence assets capable ofrapidly transitioning ashore with minimaldegradation of support.3. The Intelligence Cycle and<strong>Amphibious</strong> <strong>Operations</strong>a. Planning and Direction. There are anumber of unique intelligence considerations<strong>for</strong> amphibious operations. During theembarked planning phase, the co-equalamphibious and landing <strong>for</strong>ce intelligenceofficers direct their personnel from theintelligence center established within theamphibious <strong>for</strong>ce to support the intelligenceneeds of embarked commands. Theintelligence center brings together ship’scompany, amphibious <strong>for</strong>ce, and otherembarked component intelligence-relatedactivities. While personnel and materialremain organic to their respective commands,they may task-organize to per<strong>for</strong>mintelligence work necessary <strong>for</strong> completionof the mission.b. Collection. During the planning phase,amphibious <strong>for</strong>ce collections are primarilyconducted by national, theater, JTF, and othernaval assets. These assets collect in<strong>for</strong>mationV-2in denied and remote areas withoutcompromising operations security (OPSEC)and per<strong>for</strong>m missions at significant distancesfrom embarked <strong>for</strong>ces. The paucity of thesesystems and their inherent limitations oftenresult in an incomplete intelligence picture.Advance <strong>for</strong>ce or pre-assault collectionoperations by ATF, LF, and other navalassets are often required to confirm andfurther develop the operational picture. Anintensive pre-assault intelligence ef<strong>for</strong>t willprovide support <strong>for</strong> target selection whileensuring that collection operations do notexpose the commander’s intent.c. Processing and Exploitation.Individual intelligence sections will normallyconcentrate on their particular areas ofexpertise, satisfying their units’ requirementswhile contributing a broad-scope product tothe general intelligence production ef<strong>for</strong>t. Forexample, LF intelligence could analyze theland battlespace, to include the enemy’s C2,ground <strong>for</strong>ces, logistics, and reserves, whileATF intelligence could analyze enemymaritime <strong>for</strong>ces and coastal defense threats.Air threats could be analyzed from a combinedamphibious <strong>for</strong>ce perspective.d. Analysis and Production. During theanalysis and production phase, all availableprocessed in<strong>for</strong>mation is integrated, analyzed,evaluated, and interpreted to create productsthat will satisfy the amphibious <strong>for</strong>cecommanders’ requirements. Intelligenceproducts are generally placed in one of sixcategories: indications and warning; currentintelligence; general military intelligence;target intelligence; scientific and technicalintelligence; and counterintelligence.e. Dissemination and Integration.Intelligence dissemination and integrationduring amphibious operations presentssignificant challenges. <strong>Amphibious</strong> <strong>for</strong>ce andsupporting <strong>for</strong>ces can be widely dispersed andmay not assemble until late in the planningphase, if at all. Advances in technology haveJP 3-02
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Chapter XVmaneuverability. This org
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Chapter XVc. Execution. The amphibi
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