Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations - Historic Naval Ships ...

Chapter IXIX-4nonlethal fires, from NSFS and CAS toEA.• Obscuration. Obscuration hampersenemy observation and TA, and concealsfriendly activities and movement. EAprevents the enemy use of radar and radiosignals to observe and report theoperation.• Security. Support forces prevent theenemy from interfering with obstaclereduction and the passage of the assaultwaves through the breach lanes. Securitymust be effective against coastal defensesand counterattack forces. Vertical assaultforces may seize and deny routes ofingress into the landing area to preventthe counterattack of the landing beaches.• Reduction. Reduction forces, normallycomposed of ATF and LF elements,create lanes through the mines andobstacles, allowing the assault waves topass. The location of lanes dependslargely on identified weaknesses in themine and obstacle belt. If the amphibiousforce cannot find gaps or weak coveragein the obstacles, they will applyconcentrated force at a designated pointto rupture the defense and create a gap.Units reducing the obstacle mark the laneand report the obstacle type, location, andlane locations to higher headquarters.Lanes are handed over to follow-onforces who further reduce or clear theobstacles, if required.5. Operations in Nuclear,Biological, and ChemicalEnvironmentsThe employment or threat of NBC weaponsand other toxic materials poses uniquechallenges when conducting amphibiousoperations. NBC-capable nations, includingmany developing nations, may use theseweapons to achieve political and militaryobjectives. The NBC threat occurs across thefull range of military operations, includingMOOTW. Improvements in missiletechnology that increases the range andprecision of NBC weapons and the use ofmines and barriers to canalize or impede theamphibious forces may make it vulnerable toattack. These trends require amphibious forcecommanders to consider the challenges posedby NBC weapons when conductingamphibious operations. There should be aclear understanding of the potential NBCthreats, and planning should include plans tominimize amphibious force vulnerabilities.Refer to JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operationsin Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)Environments.a. Responsibilities. Combatantcommanders must be able to executecampaigns under NBC threats andenvironments through unified action at thetheater level. Unified action encompasses notonly NBC-related actions but also all otheractions that permit continuation of theateroperations and focus on attaining the singletheater military objective in line with the JFC’sintent. The amphibious force must becapable of operating in an NBCenvironment to attain the amphibious forceobjectives, which are a part of the JFC’soverall objectives. Within the amphibiousforce, the CATF is responsible for NBCdefense of the assigned amphibious forceafloat, including the LF while embarked. TheCLF is responsible for NBC defense of thelanding force once ashore.b. Planning Considerations. Amphibiousforce commanders must address potentialNBC threats during the planning phase.• NBC defense plans must includeprovisions for the following.•• Requesting supporting operations toeliminate or reduce an adversary’s NBCJP 3-02