Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations - Historic Naval Ships ...

The Intelligence Cycle and Amphibious Operationsimproved intelligence dissemination betweenafloat forces, but limitations still exist in thequantity and quality of intelligenceexchanged. The immense volume of datarequired overtaxes communications andintelligence systems, to include criticalgraphic products that must be distributedduring the planning phase. Intelligenceofficers at all levels, working in coordinationwith unit operations and communicationsinformationsystems officers, must developplans that provide dissemination of actionableintelligence in a timely manner to all elementsof the amphibious force. Units located onships not equipped with the latest C2,communications, or intelligence systems willbe a high priority. Intelligence must bedisseminated in a timely manner to ensure thatit is integrated into the amphibious planningand decision making processes. Rather thanan end of a process, the integration ofintelligence is a continuous dialogue betweenthe user and the producer.f. Evaluation and Feedback. During theevaluation and feedback phase, intelligencepersonnel at all levels assess how each phaseof the intelligence cycle is being performed.Commanders and staffs throughout theamphibious force must provide feedback ifthey are not receiving timely, accurate, usable,complete, and relevant information to supportthe operation. Within the intelligence center,the amphibious force intelligence officers arealso evaluating the intelligence cycle toimprove performance.4. Key Intelligence Activitiesand Goals During Planninga. Mission Analysis. Intelligence activitiessupport mission analysis by providing basicintelligence on the nature of the area ofoperations and the threat. Concurrently, whilemission analysis is ongoing, intelligenceindications and warning will monitor the AOIand identify developing crisis situations and/or potential amphibious force missions.During mission analysis, intelligenceoperations must:• Orient the commander and operationalplanners to the battlespace and the natureof the threat;• Aid in the development of commander’sintent by outlining what is operationallypossible and most advantageous; and• Receive guidance from the commanderto help shape intelligence operations.b. Course of Action Development.Intelligence operations support COAdevelopment by:• Defining operational possibilitiesthrough the IPB process;• Continuously updating the view of thebattlespace and estimates of enemycapabilities, intentions, and activities;• Providing focus on the adversary throughidentification of threat COGs, criticalvulnerabilities, and potential COAs, withemphasis on the most likely and mostdangerous COAs; and• Assisting in the prioritization of targetsof interest.c. Course of Action Analysis.Intelligence operations assist COA analysisby:• Identifying and refining likely anddangerous enemy COAs and actions and/or reactions to friendly COAs underconsideration;• Playing the role of the enemy duringwargaming of COAs;• Developing an independent evaluation ofeach friendly COA based upon anV-3