2336and Jaffna until the conflict is over. The LTTE also recruits children (see Section6.c.).g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts.—Hostilitiesbetween the Government and the LTTE continued throughout theyear. After establishing positions on the Jaffna peninsula in January, the LTTE inMarch began a sustained campaign to recapture Jaffna. On April 22, the LTTE captureda large base at Elephant Pass, and in the following weeks, forced the armedforces to retreat to Jaffna. By late May, the front lines had stabilized just east ofJaffna in the Chavacachcheri area. From June through August, there were minorskirmishes, with the armed forces carrying out counterattacks from Septemberthrough year’s end that resulted in high casualties on both sides. More than 2,000combatants and more than 100 civilians died during the year in incidents relatedto the conflict.At year’s end, approximately 490,000 persons were displaced by the conflict. Over340,000 persons, principally in the Vanni region, remain displaced by the past severalyears of fighting; during the year the battles near Jaffna displaced an additional150,000.The Government in the past often publicized aspects of its planned operations toallow civilians time to vacate the probable areas to be affected. However, the armedforces were more secretive during the year, and it did not give public warnings beforethe commencement of its advances. Despite the use of unmanned aerial vehiclesto assess targets before attacks, bombings and artillery fire against LTTE installationshave killed civilians working at those installations or living nearby. More than100 civilians were killed in the LTTE’s advance on Jaffna in April and May, including6 who died at Pallaikudu in May when the armed forces conducted an aerialbombing of an LTTE boat dock. More than a dozen persons were killed by the airforce in bombings against Mullaitivu during the year. On April 19, artillery shellskilled 15 and wounded 24 at a home for the elderly in Kaithady during a clash betweenthe LTTE and the army. It was not clear which side was responsible. On November23, 2 shells thought to be fired by the LTTE landed near a school in Muttur,near Trincomalee, killing 2 students and wounding 10 more. During the year, dozensof civilians were wounded in contested areas of the north and east in clashesbetween the armed forces and the LTTE.On May 17, 23 people were killed and dozens were injured when a bomb explodedat a Buddhist temple in Batticaloa in the east, where people were gathered to celebratethe Buddhist festival of Vesak (see Section 1.a.). The bomb, concealed in afreezer box on a bicycle, exploded after the cyclist was stopped by two policemenand a soldier; the cyclist ran away. After the bomb exploded, security forces openedfire, killing four children and injuring eight more. Although the Government hasblamed the LTTE publicly for this bombing, no one officially claimed responsibility,and at year’s end, no investigation had been conducted. Furthermore the Governmenthas not commented on the additional deaths and injuries caused by the securityforces opening fire.The security forces use aerial observation for selecting targets for shelling andbombing. They also attempt to locate the source of incoming mortar fire before responding;however, inaccurate mortar and artillery fire killed civilians. In September1999, the air force dropped 3 bombs on a village near Puthukudiyiruppu inthe Vanni, killing 22 persons (see Section 1.a.). Human rights observers, includingthe ICRC and AI, alleged that those killed were civilians. Government officials acknowledgedthat 22 men, women, and children were killed by the air force bomb;however, they alleged that the air force targeted an LTTE training camp, and atfirst they did not admit the possibility that civilians were killed in error. The Governmentlater acknowledged quietly that the attack was an accident. During theyear, the Government held an investigation and authorized compensation for thevictim’s families, admitting that the site had been bombed ‘‘in error.’’ However, theGovernment did not admit formally to having killed civilians.The security forces continued to receive instruction in international humanitarianlaw as part of their training courses (see Section 4). According to the military, thearmy also established human rights cells in each division, and it established ahuman rights office in each brigade and battalion. The armed forces operate underwritten rules of engagement that severely restrict the shelling, bombardment, orother use of firepower against civilian-occupied areas such as villages.The Government continued to provide food relief, through the Commissioner Generalfor Essential Services (CGES) and the Multi-Purpose Cooperative Societies(MCPS), to displaced and other needy citizens, including those in areas controlledby the LTTE. Food rations were delivered by the Government to the Vanni areathrough a checkpoint that is controlled on one side by the security forces and onVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:46 Sep 20, 2001 Jkt 071555 PO 00000 Frm 00180 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\COUNTRYR\S71555\71555.036 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
2337the other by the LTTE. The border into the territory controlled by the LTTE (an‘‘uncleared area’’ in Government parlance) was not closed during the year.The Government maintained a long list of prohibited ‘‘war-related’’ medical items,such as sutures, plaster of paris, intravenous liquid supplies, bandages, and somedrugs. NGO’s and other groups that sought to take these items to LTTE-controlledareas in the Vanni region needed permission from local officials as well as from theMinistry of Defense. Delays were common and approval sometimes was denied, dueto fear that supplies would fall into the hands of the LTTE. As a result, many medicalitems in the Vanni region were in short supply. This shortfall contributed toan already serious deterioration in the quality and quantity of medical care furnishedto the civilian population. During the first half of the year, the Governmentproved particularly reluctant to allow medical supplies into LTTE-controlled areas.During this period, civilians injured in the conflict relied heavily on aid providedby international NGO’s who faced severe restrictions on moving medical suppliesinto the area. Government restrictions on the transport of items such as cement,batteries, and currency into the LTTE-controlled areas also had a negative impacton the relief work of NGO’s in those areas.The Ministry of Defense reported capturing several LTTE insurgents on the battlefieldduring the year. It sent these, and other cadres who surrendered or whomsecurity forces arrested to rehabilitation centers. The ICRC continued to visit approximately100 former LTTE members now in government rehabilitation camps, althoughthe October massacre of more than 20 such detainees at a government-rundetention facility at Bindunuwewa, near Bandarawella, led observers to questionthe continued security of residents of these facilities (see Section 1.a.).In view of the scale of hostilities and the large number of LTTE casualties, someobservers found the number of prisoners taken under battlefield conditions to be lowand concluded that many LTTE fighters apparently were killed rather than takenprisoner. Some observers believed that, on the government side, an unwritten ‘‘takeno-prisoners’’policy generally remained in effect. The military denied this claim,stating that other factors limited the number of prisoners taken, such as the LTTE’sefforts to remove wounded fighters from the battlefield, the proclivity of its fightersto choose suicide over capture, and the LTTE’s occasional practice of killing its ownbadly wounded fighters (see Section 1.a.). There were no reported instances of securityforces personnel executing LTTE cadres this year, and no army or other securityforces personnel were prosecuted or disciplined for allegedly executing prisonersfrom previous years.The Government refused to permit relief organizations to provide medical attentionto wounded LTTE fighters, although it has offered to treat any LTTE woundedentrusted to government care. Credible reports told of wounded LTTE cadres surrenderingto the Government and receiving appropriate medical care.The LTTE admits that it kills security forces personnel rather than take themprisoner. Eyewitness accounts confirm that the LTTE has executed wounded soldierson the battlefield. At the end of September, the LTTE admitted to holding only11 security forces prisoners, all captured in 1993 and 1994. The LTTE is believedto have killed most of the police officers and security force personnel that it has capturedin recent years. However, the LTTE released two army deserters who surrenderedto it in 1998, and in November 1999, it transferred over 11 SLA members whowere captured during the year to the ICRC. In February the LTTE released fourservicemen, and in June it released one civilian.The LTTE uses excessive force in the war. During the course of the year, theLTTE killed a government minister (see Section 1.a.) and more than 200 other noncombatants.The LTTE has engaged in hostage taking, hijackings, and bombing ofcivilian targets.In the past, the LTTE has used church and temple compounds, where civiliansare instructed by the Government to congregate in the event of hostilities, as shieldsfor the storage of munitions; however, there were no reports that this occurred duringthe year.The LTTE uses child soldiers. The armed forces captured a 14-year-old femaleLTTE cadre in fighting in September, and during the year credible sources reportedLTTE efforts to recruit children to replenish battlefield losses. According to some reportsthe LTTE shows war movies and gives political speeches to children in schools.In September 1998, 25 young LTTE fighters surrendered as a group; at least oneof those who surrendered was 13 years old. Most of the others were aged between15 and 17 years. In 1998 the LTTE promised the U.N. Secretary General’s SpecialRepresentative for Children in Armed Conflict that it would not recruit childrenunder 17 and would not use children under 18 in battle. It disregarded those promises.VerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:46 Sep 20, 2001 Jkt 071555 PO 00000 Frm 00181 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\COUNTRYR\S71555\71555.036 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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2163All factions probably hold poli
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2165and unexploded ordnance. Nevert
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2167bade non-Muslims from living in
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2183ment of the split verdict in th
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2191about 125 refugees and asylum s
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2195Indigenous People.—Tribal peo
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2209Children.—The Government has
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2215Accountability remains a seriou
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2233three Border Security Force mem
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2235fice owned by an NGO at Konung
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2253The burning of churches continu
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2255suspected of belonging to an up
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2257Bonded labor, the result of a p
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2261and ‘‘inhuman treatment.’
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2263illustration of the consequence
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2265The Government has permitted pr
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2267lations governing Internet acce
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2269Women traditionally have played
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2271In 1997 the Government for the
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2273pali Congress Party flags. A bo
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2277of the monarch who allegedly ki
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2279the Government generally does n
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2281areas along the country’s bor
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2283groups. Nevertheless, converts
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- Page 139 and 140: 2295Farooq Sattar was arrested by o
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- Page 149 and 150: 2305which stipulated a sentence of
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- Page 155 and 156: 2311sioners review blasphemy cases
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- Page 159 and 160: 2315late head of the Board of Inter
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- Page 187 and 188: 2343September 29, the Center for Mo
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