BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

contain the adversary forces and roll them back . This means
local air bases and seaports must be available and protected .
Yet, the US and allied armed forces, in confronting a
Saddam Hussein with nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC)
warfare capabilities might be well advised to forego massing
forces (which present lucrative targets to the enemy's WMD) in
favor of maneuver, dispersion, speed, mobility, range, and
deception . How to protect fixed installations such as ports and
airfields is a dilemma . Furthermore, Schneider tells us, the
principle of maintaining the "offensive" may have to be
supplemented "with a combination of potent defenses to avoid
lethal enemy "DI counterstrikes ."
In twenty-first-century warfare, theater missile defenses
(TMD) are likely to be essential, especially against future rogue
regimes possessing nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads
and ballistic missile delivery systems . These could pose a
threat against US and allied forces, ports, airfields, naval
convoys, and cities within range that only effective multilayered
TMD may be able to handle .
When facing a WMD-armed adversary, it will be even more
important than in the past to preserve "unity of command" via
effective command, control, and communications during a
conflict . Moreover, it is highly likely that, in an era of "information
warfare," both sides will attempt and may be able to
disrupt and destroy each other's command and control systems .
Regarding the principle of clear, obtainable "objectives,"
Schneider argues that war with a nuclear-armed terrorist
state "must either be a short victorious war that starts with
the neutralization or destruction of the enemy's WMD, or one
fought for limited objectives and prosecuted with deep respect
for the power of the adversary's mass destruction capabilities ."
This would require a revolution in the way US regional
"war-fighting" commanders in chief prepare for major regional
conflicts (MRC) . It might be difficult for US decision makers to
"sell" such a strategy to an American public, given our
penchant for quick, decisive victories .
Finally, "security" as a principle of war demands exceptionally
good intelligence . In the future, it will be especially important
to identify those states acquiring WMD and missile
capabilities and to gauge their locations and numbers from