BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

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INFORMATION WARFARE exploiting our own information operations ."3 Additionally in this context, information warfare "views itself as both separate realm and lucrative target ."4 While this definition is new, the concept isn't . It is only as we come to terms with the benefits of the computer age that we realize the potential in conducting the operations described above . The computer age gives us the capability to absorb, evaluate, use, transmit, and exchange large volumes of information at high speeds to multiple recipients simultaneously . Multiple sources of data can be correlated faster than ever. Until recently, masses of information were transmitted in the literal, or alphanumeric format, and had to be read and manually manipulated to be of any use . This made it difficult to sort the critical from the useful, and much of the information went into the burn bag . Today, much of that same information is transmitted to the war fighter digitally and presented graphically . Little goes to waste . Thus, the value of information, its uses, and our dependence on it have been magnified to a new level . Duane Andrews, former assistant secretary of defense for C3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence), describes information today as a "strategic asset ."5 The Tofflers go even further . In their discussion on third wave war, they refer to "knowledge warriors," describing them as "intellectuals in and out of uniform dedicated to the idea that knowledge can win, or prevent, wars ."6 Maj Gen Kenneth Minihan, Air Force assistant chief of staff for intelligence, describes information warfare in more objective terms, which he says is really "information dominance . "7 In describing information dominance, he puts it this way : Information dominance is not "my pile of information is bigger than yours" in some sort of linear sense . It is not just a way to reduce the fog of war on our side or thicken it on the enemy's side . It is not analysis of yesterday's events, although proper application of historical analysis is important to gaining information dominance . It is something that is battled for, like air superiority. It is a way of increasing our capabilities by using that information to make right decisions, (and) apply them faster than the enemy can . It is a way to alter the enemy's entire perception of reality . It is a method of using all information at our disposal to predict (and affect) what happens tomorrow before the enemy even jumps out ofbed and thinks about what to do today ."8 173
BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE The Navy presents the bottom line view : "Information, in all its forms, is the keystone to success . "9 The Department of Defense and all of the services are doing more than paying lip service to this new dimension . In addition to their attempts to fund extended programs in this subject, senior military leaders are taking strong positions in favor of this capability . Unfortunately, while the United States holds the lead in information technology today, other nations, including developing nations, are rapidly gaining access to this capability . This is cause for concern, and the answers are not simple . Information Warfare in World War H : How Far Did Churchill Go? World War II saw many firsts . Some of the more significant examples were : large-scale air-to-air combat, strategic bombing-both daylight and nightthe use of naval carriers to project airpower, and the first and only uses of atomic bombs during hostilities . The following case study asserts that we also saw the first widespread and well-orchestrated use of information warfare, and presents a hypothetical model for interaction between deception and cryptanalysis . Many of us remain intrigued by the clandestine and covert operations conducted by the Allies in WWII . This study discusses two of those operations : deception and cryptanalysis based on radio intercepts . It also, and more importantly, attempts to build a model for an interactive relationship between the two that could have synergistically improved the contributions of these operations to the successful prosecution of the war . The model, though purely hypothetical, uses facts to present a case for the potential of maximizing misinformation through the integration of these two disciplines . Said another way, this paper suggests that the Allied leadership, specifically Winston Churchill, found cryptanalysis necessary but not sufficient for victory . Cryptanalysis and deception were both necessary and 174
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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE 21st Cent
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To Keegie (eSchneider) who so fully
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Battlefield of the Future 21st Cent
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Acknowledgments We, the editors, wi
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Introduction This is a book about s
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the outset of a conflict. This will
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Chapter 1 Principles of War for the
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR by the proliferat
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR should not be eng
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Some would argue
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR designed to fight
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR presenting the en
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Col John Warden,
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR allied forces in
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR The enemy WMD thr
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR military operatio
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR politically in Ir
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Moreover, as Sadd
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR The Principle of
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Until the NASTI r
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR S - Simultaneity
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR effective logisti
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR organizations, el
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Notes 1 . Rogue s
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR attempted to fost
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Overview : New Era Warfare? A Revol
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NEW ERAWARFARE? Patriot, which was
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Chapter 2 New-Era Warfare Gen Charl
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NEW-ERA WARFARE many nations that a
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NEW-ERAWARFARE brilliant decision o
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NEW-ERAWARFARE The United States ca
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NEW-ERA WARFARE Terminal-phase Inte
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NEW-ERAWARFARE have to fight for th
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NEW-ERAWARFARE might retaliate with
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NEW-ERAWARFARE Our nuclear-weapons
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NEW-ERAWARFARE to our disadvantage,
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Chapter 3 The Revolution in Militar
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THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
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Overview : Future Airpower and Stra
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FUTURE AIRPOWER AND STRATEGY ISSUES
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Chapter 4 Air Theory for the Twenty
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AIRTHEORY FORTHE TWENTY-FIRST CENTU
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AIRTHEORY FORTHETWENTY-FIRST CENTUR
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AIRTHEORY FOR THETWENTY-FIRST CENTU
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AIR THEORY FORTHE TWENTY-FIRST CENT
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THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON they say the
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THE BIOLOGICALWEAPON 43 . "Biologic
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Chapter 9 Twenty-First Century Germ
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GERM WARFARE u
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURYGERM WARFARE fo
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'TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GERM WARFARE
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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE the grisl
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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE pursue BW
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GERM WARFARE b
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURYGERM WARFARE ma
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GERM WARFARE N
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Chapter 10 Biological Weapons for W
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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS FORWAGING ECONOM
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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS FOR WAGING ECONO
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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS FOR WAGING ECONO
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Chapter 11 On Twenty-first Century
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warfare, space war, precision warfa
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example, where the United States as
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5,500 more . This group also had be
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About the Contributors James Blackw
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College . A retired US Navy command
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finishing a book on "Counterprolife
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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

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