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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

Battlefield of the Future - Air University Press

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<strong>BATTLEFIELD</strong> <strong>OF</strong> <strong>THE</strong> <strong>FUTURE</strong><br />

Inchon invasion during the Korean War? Indeed, would the US<br />

nuclear threat communicated to Beijing via the Indian government<br />

have been credible if the People's Republic of China also<br />

had possessed nuclear warheads and long-range aircraft in<br />

1953? In the 1990-91 Gulf War, how would things have been<br />

different if Iraq had possessed even a few nuclear weapons and<br />

had been prepared to use them prior to the allied ground<br />

offensive while coalition troops were massing in Saudi Arabia?<br />

The Principle of Maneuver in Warfare<br />

Perhaps far greater emphasis will have to be placed on<br />

maneuver, the second "M" in J.F.C . Fuller's principles of war,<br />

rather than on the first "M," mass . Inherent in maneuver is the<br />

idea that mobility enhances both offensive and defensive<br />

capabilities as well as one's ability to achieve a viable deterrent<br />

and escalation superiority in both peace and war.<br />

Coupled with the need for maneuver is the concept of<br />

dispersion . Armies in modern times are increasingly mobile<br />

and dispersed due to increases in battlefield lethality and<br />

other technical changes . Moving and spreading out gives the<br />

adversary less probability of targeting success and less of a<br />

target to hit. Prudence would advise spreading friendly forces<br />

even more in the future to expose fewer of them to any single<br />

WMD attack .<br />

On the other hand, this need to disperse forces can greatly<br />

hinder conventional combat capability . An army dispersed will<br />

have less capability for achieving local superiority and<br />

breakthroughs against its opponents armed forces and less<br />

opportunity for battle and war termination until the main<br />

weapons of the enemy are silenced .<br />

The need to simultaneously guard against vulnerability to<br />

WMD attack and to conduct a conventional campaign will<br />

impose contradictory pressures on regional CINCs planning<br />

future campaigns . Such dual concerns might prevent quick,<br />

decisive engagements in the future that are based on the 1991<br />

Gulf War model . Instead, future armies may be forced to fight<br />

more at the low-intensity warfare level or to engage in<br />

prolonged conventional wars of attrition while avoiding<br />

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