BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE
enemy's air defenses always must be the first priority of an air
campaign . 27 If the theorists and air campaigners assert that
suppression of enemy air defenses was not their first priority
in time and in space, that assertion appears to contradict
current air doctrine . If they accept that coping with enemy air
defense capability was the first priority, but reply that the first
wave of attacks included other targets, then the attacks were
not simultaneous, but merely very close in time . (Zeno
probably would argue that any separation in time, however,
constitutes serial warfare.) In truth, the opening salvos of the
Desert Storm air campaign were directed-as they must be for
air power to be effective-against the enemy air defense
system, the "crucial first step" in the air campaign . 28
Sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles and Army Apache
helicopters were part of this first wave of atrpower attacks for
airpower's benefit. How quickly other targets in the series
followed, becomes less relevant to the theory . A compressed
serial attack is still serial warfare, even though time
compression may create the appearance and, more important,
the effect of sirrlultaneity . 29
Because the five-rings model for air campaign planning
asserts that the consequence of its attacks will be paralysis of
the enemy system, it in effect asserts that the Napoleonic and
Clausewitzian "decisive battle" is its aim. Moreover, it seeks to
annihilate enemy capability. 3o (It does this, by the way, even
while some of its advocates suggest that their theories now
might have rendered much or most of Clausewitz irrelevant .) If
the aim of the air campaign is not achieved-that is, if the
consequent is not affirmed-then the fault must reside not in
the air campaign, but somewhere else .31 Dogmatic adherence
to the air campaign plan list of priority targets is necessary to
"prove" the theory . Close air support, the theory holds, is less
important than strategic attack . If sorties have to be
reapportioned because of some "ground emergency," then the
dogma has been violated and, of course, the opportunity to
win a decisive battle may have then been lost. Where the
targeting list is followed religiously, failure to achieve a
decisive battle can also be attributed to inadequate
intelligence . Or it could be bad weather, the bane of aviation .
Or it could be caused by an adaptive enemy.
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