BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

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INFORMATION WAR - CYBERWAR - NETWAR ability to know anything with certainty and, thereby, his capacity for minimal reasoning or pragmatic communication . In some exercises during the cold war "decapitation" of the Soviet military leadership in a hypothetical nuclear exchange was intended to defend the United States by preventing an escalatory or exploitative strike, nuclear or otherwise . Precisely how war termination would have been accomplished without an effective leadership will remain, hopefully, one of the great mysteries . The "decapitation" of the leadership is, however, often proposed as a key goal of an information war . That is, the credibility and legitimacy-even the physical ability to communicate-of the decisionmakers will be compromised or destroyed relative to their own population and in terms of their own worldview . And even if we merely "seize" his communication system electronically and substitute our "reality" into his society, with whom, then, do we negotiate the end of the conflict? What confidence do we have that a call to surrender, even if communicated to the people by either the enemy leadership or our "net warriors," would be accepted as "real" and not another "virtual" event? And, depending on the content, intensity, and "totality" of a strategic information war, personalities could be flooded with irrational or unconsciousness factors-the clinical consequence of which is generally acute psychosis . How do we accomplish conflict resolution, war termination, or postconflict reconstruction with a population or leadership whose "objective reasoning" has been compromised? Just as the mutually destructive effects of nuclear war were disproportionate to the goals of almost any imaginable conflict, so may be the mutually destructive effects of a "total" information war exchange on the publics exposed and subsequent rational communication between the sides . And as the techniques of "cyberstrike" proliferate throughout the world, enabling small powers, nonstate actors, or even terrorist hackers to do massive damage to the United States, "mutually assured cyberdestruction" may result in a kind of infowar deterrence . As Sun-Tzu advised, "without advantage, do not act ; without gain, do not utilize ; without crises, do not battle ."23 Information War, then, may be the central national security issue of the twenty-first century . Therefore, the United States 167
BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE must develop a coherent national-level policy on the military and strategic use of new information warfare technologies . To facilitate this objective, the US armed forces are developing, under the rubric of command and control warfare, the technologies and systems that will provide the capability for "cyberwar ." It may be possible to control and exploit information so as to purposely generate stochastic chaos, though there are some doubts .24 Many of the same technologies and systems can be used to develop a national-level capability for strategic "netwar ." Here, however, there are genuine doubts . As Voegelin feared, it may not be possible to control and exploit information and information technologies to impose "a form on the remnants of societies no longer capable of selforganization" because their substantive universe of meaning has been destroyed or corrupted .25 Few info-warriors would claim the ability to "reorient" the former Soviet Union into a liberal society, or to influence the far more ancient barbarism in that heart of darkness, Rwanda . Perhaps strategic-level information war is, indeed, like nuclear war: the capability is required for deterrence ; its employment, the folly of mutually assured destruction . But if the United States is to develop the capacity for information war, in the sure and certain knowledge that the technologies have already "proliferated" to both state and nonstate potential rivals, a realistic national consensus must be built. It is useless to pretend that the proliferation of these technologies will not provide capabilities that can do serious harm . It is useless to pretend that military-based command and control warfare capabilities will not be developed, and it is useless to pretend that cyberwar technologies could not be turned to netwar applications . It is almost universally agreed that these capabilities are essential on the contemporary battlefield . It is essential, then, that the president and the Congress give serious and sustained attention to cyberwar, netwar, and information war. 168
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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE 21st Cent
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To Keegie (eSchneider) who so fully
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Battlefield of the Future 21st Cent
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Acknowledgments We, the editors, wi
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Introduction This is a book about s
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the outset of a conflict. This will
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Chapter 1 Principles of War for the
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR by the proliferat
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR should not be eng
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Some would argue
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR designed to fight
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR presenting the en
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Col John Warden,
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR allied forces in
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR The enemy WMD thr
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR military operatio
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR politically in Ir
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Moreover, as Sadd
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR The Principle of
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Until the NASTI r
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR S - Simultaneity
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR effective logisti
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR organizations, el
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Notes 1 . Rogue s
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR attempted to fost
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Overview : New Era Warfare? A Revol
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NEW ERAWARFARE? Patriot, which was
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Chapter 2 New-Era Warfare Gen Charl
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NEW-ERA WARFARE many nations that a
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NEW-ERAWARFARE brilliant decision o
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NEW-ERAWARFARE The United States ca
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NEW-ERA WARFARE Terminal-phase Inte
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NEW-ERAWARFARE have to fight for th
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NEW-ERAWARFARE might retaliate with
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NEW-ERAWARFARE Our nuclear-weapons
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NEW-ERAWARFARE to our disadvantage,
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Chapter 3 The Revolution in Militar
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THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
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Overview : Future Airpower and Stra
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FUTURE AIRPOWER AND STRATEGY ISSUES
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Chapter 4 Air Theory for the Twenty
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AIRTHEORY FORTHE TWENTY-FIRST CENTU
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AIRTHEORY FORTHETWENTY-FIRST CENTUR
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AIRTHEORY FOR THETWENTY-FIRST CENTU
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Page 212 and 213: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ISSUES airliners
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THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON agents may al
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THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON higher by ord
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THE BIOLOGICAL-WEAPON terms of rapi
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THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON they say the
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THE BIOLOGICALWEAPON 43 . "Biologic
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Chapter 9 Twenty-First Century Germ
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GERM WARFARE u
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURYGERM WARFARE fo
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'TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GERM WARFARE
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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE the grisl
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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE pursue BW
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GERM WARFARE N
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Chapter 10 Biological Weapons for W
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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS FORWAGING ECONOM
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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS FOR WAGING ECONO
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Chapter 11 On Twenty-first Century
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warfare, space war, precision warfa
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example, where the United States as
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5,500 more . This group also had be
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About the Contributors James Blackw
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College . A retired US Navy command
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finishing a book on "Counterprolife
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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

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